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INTRODUCTION

Sexual harassment and wrongful termination are evolving and
expanding areas of the law.' They are also fields that sometimes
conflict, thus creating a difficult dilemma for employers.2 When an
employer learns that one of its employees is harassing another,' the

1. See Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 786 (9th Cir. 1992) (Wiggins, J., dissenting)
(asserting that parameters of sexual harassment are unclear and constantly evolving); Rabidue
v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 427 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (stating that sexual harassment is
new and unsettled concept under antidiscrimination law), aftd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied,481 U.S. 1041 (1987); FRANKELKOURI &EDNAA. ELKOUI, HOWARBITRATION WORKS
237 (4th ed. Supp. 1985-1989) (stating that sexual harassment law is still developing); Barbara
A. Brown, Labor Law. Wrongful Discharge, 1987 ANN. SURV. Am. L. 779, 805 (characterizing
wrongful discharge law as developing and subject of widespread debate); Note, Employer
Opportunism and the Need for a Just Cause Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 510, 510-16 (1989)
[hereinafter Employer Opportunism] (discussing changes and developments in employment
termination law that involve increased emphasis on job security for individual employees).
2. See Grace M. Rang, Laws CoveringSex Harassmentand WrongfulDismissal Collide,WALL ST.
J., Sept. 24, 1992, at BI (discussing conflict between federal sexual harassment law and
requirement ofjust or good cause for discharge contained in some state laws and employment
contracts). The Kang article provided the impetus for this Comment.
3. Ordinarily, the harassed, or victim, is female, while the harasser is male. This Comment
therefore uses female pronouns to refer to the victim, or alleged victim, and male pronouns to
refer to the harasser, or alleged harasser. SeeLipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881,
898 n.19 (1st Cir. 1988) (declaring that "[m]ost reported harassment is of women by men");
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (observing that typical scenario
involves male supervisor harassing female employee); SExuALrIY IN ORGANIZATIONS: ROMANTIc
AND COERCiVE BEHAVIORS AT WORK 3 (Dail A. Neugarten & Jay M. Shafritz eds., 1980)
[hereinafter SExuALrYIN ORGANzATIONS] (noting that although men occasionally are subjected
to sexual harassment, women are victimized more often); ELLENJ. WAGNER, SEXUAL HARASSmENT
IN THE WORKPLACE 2 (1992) (asserting that although both sexes can be harassers and victims
of harassment, "the great majority of situations involve one or more male harassers and a lower-
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employer often must choose between two courses of action, both of
which have great potential for liability.' The employer can discharge
the harasser and risk a lawsuit or grievance for wrongful termination.'
In the alternative, the employer can take milder disciplinary action
and risk a lawsuit by the victim if the harassment continues.6
Compounding the precarious nature of the employer's dilemma,
the Senate confirmation hearings of Justice Clarence Thomas
dramatically raised public consciousness of sexual harassment.7 As a

level female harassee" and concluding that "[sihe is therefore still very much a proper pronoun
when sexual harassment is discussed").
Not only are fewer men than women sexually harassed, but those men that are harassed suffer
fewerjob-related consequences than female victims of sexual harassment. SeeBarbaraA. Gutek,
Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POLy' 335, 350
(1992) (noting statistics that show that male workers are less likely than female workers to quit
or get fired after being sexually harassed). According to one study, fewer than one percent of
male respondents had ever quit ajob because of sexual harassment and none had ever been
fired because of harassment. Id. at 350 (citing BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE:
IMPACT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN AND ORGANIZATIONS (1985)).
4. See Kang, supranote 2, at BI (stating that employers face risk of liability to both victim
and harasser).
5. It is common for employees discharged for sexual harassment to file wrongful
termination lawsuits and grievances. See, e.g., Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union,
Allied Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d 685, 687-88 (7th Cir.) (upholding arbitration award of
reinstatement for wrongful discharge grievant who was terminated for sexually assaulting female
co-worker), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 304 (1992); Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union,
915 F.2d 840, 841 (2d Cir. 1990) (vacating labor arbitrator's award of reinstatement to employee
discharged for sexually harassing co-worker as contrary to public policy), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1314 (1991); Howard v. Department of the Air Force, 877 F.2d 952, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(rejecting wrongful termination claim of employee discharged for kissing, touching, and making
sexual remarks to female co-workers); Scherer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 766 F. Supp. 593, 603
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (rejecting claim of wrongful discharge where plaintiff had been discharged for
sexual harassment), affid, 975 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1992); Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 762 F. Supp. 1187, 1189 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (vacating arbitration award of
reinstatement for wrongful discharge grievant who was terminated for sexually abusing
customer's employee), aftd, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.), cert. denie, 113 S. Ct 660 (1992);
Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280, 281 (N.M. 1988) (affirming decision in favor of
wrongful termination plaintiff discharged for sexual harassment), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109
(1989); Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. Texas-Gulf Fed'n, 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 957, 963 (1991)
(Baroni, Arb.) (upholding discharge of complainant who was fired for sexual harassment);
Clover Park Sch. Dist. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 76,
88 (1987) (Boedecker, Arb.) (sustaining wrongful termination grievance of employee discharged
for sexual harassment and ordering reinstatement with back pay); Sugardale Foods Inc. v. Local
17A, United Food & Commercial Workers, 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1017, 1022-23 (1986)
(Duda, Arb.) (reinstating complainant who was discharged for sexual harassment).
6. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1514-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
employer liable for sexual harassment committed by supervisors because employer failed to take
adequate remedial action); Lipsett 864 F.2d at 909 (holding that plaintiff presented sufficient
facts to establish employer's liability for sexual harassment); Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F.
Supp. 369, 380-81 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (finding employer liable for sexual harassment committed
by employees because supervisors took insufficient disciplinary action by placing warning letter
in harasser's personnel file); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780,785 (E.D. Wis. 1984)
(holding employer liable to victim of sexual harassment where harassers did not respond to
employer's warnings and other disciplinary actions).
7. SeeJane Gross, Suffering in Silence No More: FightingSexual Harassmen4 N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 1992, at Al (reporting that Anita Hill's accusation of sexual harassment against Supreme
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result, growing numbers of women are aware of their right to a
harassment-free workplace and are taking legal action to enforce that
right.' Thus, as more women file complaints, employers are potentially liable to increasing numbers of alleged victims of sexual harassment. In addition, the Civil Rights Act of 1991' expanded the
remedies available to sexual harassment plaintiffs, thereby increasing
the extent to which employers may be liable to individual victims."°
The new potential for greater liability and the recent increase in the
number of sexual harassment claims enlarge and intensify the
dilemmas that employers face with respect to allegations of sexual
harassment.1 1
While the employer's risk of liability to victims of sexual harassment
grows, the threat of a lawsuit by the discharged harasser also is

Court nominee Clarence Thomas directly increased public awareness of such misconduct).
8. See Carol Kleiman, New Tacks Against Sex Harassmen CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1992, at C2
(stating that extensive media attention on sexual harassment has resulted in greater awareness
among women of their rights and how to pursue them); Ron Nissimov, Sex HarassmentFilings Up
Since 7hwmas Hearings,Hous. CHRON., July 19, 1992, (Business Section), at 1 (reporting that
sexual harassment complaints filed with EEOC rose by 70% after Thomas confirmation
hearings); Michelle Osborn, More Victims Speak Out After Anita Hill Charges,USA TODAY, Aug. 3,
1992, at 4B (claiming that more women are aware of illegality of sexual harassment and that
complaints about harassment increased following Clarence Thomas' confirmation hearings).
9. Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 2
U.S.C.).
10. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. Im 1991). Prior to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, victims of sexual harassment had recourse to only equitable remedies. 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e) (5) (g) (1988) (establishing courts' remedial powers as "such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay.., or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate"). As a result, victims of sexual harassment who did not experience tangible
economic loss were precluded from recovering monetary damages under title VII. See Sharon
T. Bradford, Note, Relieffor Hostile Work EnvironmentDiscrimination: Restoring Title VII's Remedial
Powers, 99 YA. LJ. 1611, 1615-17 (1990) (explaining that courts generally consider monetary
damages to be legal, rather than equitable remedy, and stating that title VII provides no recovery
for noneconomic injuries).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the remedies for sexual harassment by allowing victims
to recover compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. M 1991). The 1991
Act, however, placed caps on the total amount of damages that courts may award to individual
victims of sexual harassment. Id. § 1981a(b) (3). The statute established the caps in accordance
with the size of the employer's business. The caps range from $50,000 for employers with 15
to 100 employees, to $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees. Id. §
1981a(b) (3) (A)-(D). Critics of the 1991 Act argue, however, that the caps are arbitrary because
they are based on the size of the employer's business rather than the severity of the harassment.
SeeJudith Lichtman & Holly Fechner, Almost There, 19 HuM. RTS. Q., Summer 1992, at 16, 16
(discussing criticisms of Civil Rights Act of 1991). Critics also argue that the caps are
discriminatory because they limit damages for gender discrimination only while damages for
discrimination based on race or national origin, which are recoverable under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. M 1991), remain unlimited. Lichtman & Fechner,
supra, at 18-19 (summarizing effects of caps on damages).
11. Cf David A. Larson, What Can You Say, Where Can You Say It, and to Whom? A Guide to
Understandingand PreventingUnlawful Sexual Harassmen4 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 827, 827 (1992)
("Employers must treat allegations of sexual misconduct more seriously now thatjuries have the
authority to award both compensatory and punitive damages.").
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increasing. Publicity about wrongful discharge litigation may have
raised employees' awareness of their rights, and thus may have
augmented the likelihood that a discharged employee will sue the
employer. 2 Furthermore, claims for wrongful termination are
meeting an increasingly favorable reception from judges and
arbitrators as the law moves away from the traditional common-law
doctrine, which allows termination of employment at the will of either
the employer or the employee. 3 Due to the rising number of

12. See Paul H. Tobias, CurrentTrends in Employment Dismissal Law: The Plaintiffs Perspective,
67 NEB. L. REV. 178, 184-85 (1988) (arguing that during 1980s media publicity about demise of
"at-will" doctrine increased public consciousness of rights of discharged employees and resulted
in greater number of wrongful discharge lawsuits).
13. The doctrine of employment at will "is a court developed doctrine drawn from a 19th
century treatise on the subject of master and servant." Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685
P.2d 1081, 1085 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (citing H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MASTER AND SERVANT (J.D. Parsons, Jr. ed., 1877)). The Wood treatise established the
"American Rule" whereby contracts for employment of indefinite duration were terminable by
either party at any time and for any reason. See Brown, supra note 1, at 780 (detailing origins
of employment-at-will doctrine). The majority of American courts quickly adopted Wood's
American Rule. Id. See; e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 24 (1915) (adopting doctrine of
employment at will but recognizing that employment contracts still may be enforced); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (affirming "the right of the employer, for whatever
reason, to dispense with the services of [his or her] employe[e]"); Payne v. Western & Ad. R.R.,
81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (holding that employers may dismiss employees "for good cause,
for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without being guilty of legal wrong").
Since those early days, however, changing legal, social, and economic conditions have effected
an evolution in the employment relationship. Today, the distribution of power between
employers and employees, although not equal, is more evenly balanced. See Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (discussing evolution of employment relationship
as analogous to development of property law which originally was based on ancient feudal
relationships that courts now have abandoned as outdated and inapposite to modern reality);
Tobias, supranote 12, at 181-84 (describing movement for change in employment termination
law and noting public concern for employee protection against arbitrary and discriminatory
discharge as well asjudicial and state legislative responses to such concerns). Because of these
changes, some courts have repudiated the employment-at-will doctrine in wrongful termination
cases. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925-26 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding
in favor of wrongful discharge plaintiff based on "form of estoppel" created by employee's long
length of service and employer's regulation expressing policy of good faith and fair dealing);
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980) (holding for plaintiff
employee based on implied contractual provision requiring just cause for termination); Mers v.
Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150, 153-54 (Ohio 1985) (recognizing promissory estoppel
exception to employment-at-will doctrine where employee relied on employer's statements to
his detriment); Thompson, 685 P.2d at 1088-89 (adopting exceptions to employment-at-will
doctrine based on promissory estoppel and public policy considerations); see also Employer
Opportunism, supra note 1, at 510-16 (reviewing judicially created exceptions to doctrine of
employment at will based on public policy concerns and implied contract theories, and noting
that commentators generally approve of such exceptions and recommend greater judicial and
legislative reform to abolish employment at will); infra notes 102-15 and accompanying text
(discussing history of employment at will and development of oppositional legal theory).
Wrongful termination plaintiffs also may receive favorable treatment from sympatheticjurors.
See PAUL C. WElLER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 60 (1990) (stating that in lawsuits between
unemployed worker and "deep pocket" employer, juries are likely to "err on the side of finding
the discharge to be improper, even where it really was not"); WendiJ. Delmendo, Determining
Just Cause: An EquitableSolutionfor the Workplace, 66 WASH. L REV. 831,843 (1991) (arguing that
even employees with meritless claims may succeed in wrongful termination suits due to
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wrongful discharge lawsuits and the movement to expand employee
rights, employers face an increasing risk of liability to employees
discharged for sexual harassment.
This Comment will explore the intersection of employer liability for
sexual harassment and wrongful termination. Part I introduces the
sources of employer liability: title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(title VII) 4 and contractual, statutory, and common law requirements of just cause for dismissal. Part II discusses special problems
surrounding union employees and labor arbitration in light of the
differences between arbitration and trial. Part III evaluates existing
theories for limiting employer liability. Finally, Part IV recommends
protective measures by which employers can minimize their liability
through measures including implementing policies for preventing and
redressing sexual harassment, adopting special arbitration rules for
sexual harassment discharge grievances, and stipulating in all
employment contracts that sexual harassment is just cause for
dismissal.
I.

SOURCES OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY

A.

Sexual Harassment

1.

Social context
Sexual harassment is a serious problem in the American
workplace. 5 In fact, the majority of working women have experienced sexual harassment during their working lives. 6 Most victims

sympathetic jurors).

14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. H 1990 & Supp. m 1991).
15. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that sexual harassment
"is a major problem in the workplace") (footnote omitted); Thomas I. Emerson, Foreword to
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN vii, ii (1979) (asserting
that sexual harassment is "one of the most pervasive but carefully ignored features of our
national life"); Ken Jennings & Melissa Clapp, A ManagerialTightrope: Balancing Harassedand
HarassingEmployees'Rights in SexualDiscriminationCases, 1989 LAB. hJ. 756, 756 (characterizing
sexual harassment as "widespread insidious problem") (footnote omitted); SEXUAIY IN
ORGANIZATIONS, supranote 3, at 57 (claiming that " [s ] exual harassment may be one of the most
pervasive problems facing working women... . [It] is centrally involved in the issue of women's

equality").
16. See W.B. Nelson, Sexual Harassment Title VII, and Labor Arbitration, 40 ARB. J. 55, 55
(1985) (noting surveys which find that between 70% and 90% of working women have
experienced sexual harassment at work); Kleiman, supra note 8, at C2 (reporting that recent
government study showed that 85% of all working women have been sexually harassed). In
1988, a study of Federal Government workers determined that over 40% of female federal
employees had experienced incidents ofsexual harassment during the last two years. U.S. MERIT
SYS. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 11 (1988)
[hereinafter MERIT SYSTEMS UPDATE]. The same study found that 14% of all male respondents

indicated that they had experienced some form of unwelcome sexual conduct during the last
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7
of harassment, however, never file charges against their harassers.1
Victims of sexual harassment may decide not to take formal measures
to stop their harassment because of embarrassment, fear of retaliation, fear of being labeled as a troublemaker or complainer, doubt
that formal measures will stop the harassment, fear that employers or
co-workers will not take the victim's allegations seriously, and fear that
others will blame the victim for inviting the harassment."
The social, economic, and personal costs of sexual harassment are
tremendous. Victims of sexual harassment often suffer physical,
Sexual harassment also harms
mental,19 and economic injury.2
employers, who may experience financial loss from decreased
productivity, increased use of sick leave, and increased job turn21

over.

two years. Id. at 1-2.
17. See Kleiman, supra note 8, at C2 (reporting that only 6% of employed women file
charges of sexual harassment). The 1988 study of sexual harassment in the Federal Government
showed that only 5% of respondents, both male and female, who had been sexually harassed
had taken formal action about the harassment. MERIT SYSEMS UPDATE, supra note 16, at 23.
Most of the victims of harassment that pursued formal action "viewed the actions they took as
nonproductive." I.
18. See MACKINNON, supranote 15, at 48-51 (characterizing fears shared both by women who
do and do not complain as including fears that their complaints will be trivialized, that they will
be viewed as unprofessional, and that men in their lives will believe that they "were asking for
it"); WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: LEGAL AND POLICY IssuEs 2 (1992)
(discussing 1988 magazine survey identifying "fear of retaliation" as main reason for not
reporting harassment); MERIT SYSEMS UPDATE, supranote 16, at 28, fig. 3-5 (reporting victims'
reasons for not formally reporting harassment).
19. See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1989) (reviewing
plaintiff's claim of severe depression resulting from sexual and racial harassment by supervisor);
Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing victim's
hospitalization for depression allegedly caused by two years of harassment in hostile working
environment); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that plaintiff
suffered severe emotional injury as result of sexual harassment at work); Llewellyn v. Celanese
Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369, 375 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (discussing physical and emotional illnesses,
including depression, anxiety, vomiting, chronic diarrhea, and seizures, suffered by plaintiff as
result of sexual harassment by co-workers); see also MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 47-55
(discussing physical and emotional suffering experienced by victims of sexual harassment); Peggy
Crull, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on the job: A Profile of the Experiences of 92 Women, in
SEXUALrrY IN ORGANIZATONS, supra note 3, at 70 (reviewing survey of working women who had
experienced sexual harassment and finding that 96% of respondents suffered emotional stress,
including nervousness, fear, anger, and sleeplessness, while 63% experienced physical ailments
resulting from stress, including headaches and nausea).
20. See Crull, supra note 19, at 69-71 (reporting results of survey showing that sexual
harassment directly and indirectly damages women's economic security). Crull maintains that
retaliatory or constructive discharge and denial of promotion directly impair economic security.
Id. Indirect damage results from decreased productivity, reduced concentration, and health
problems that require absence from work. Id.
21. See MERIT SYSTEMS UPDATE, supranote 16, at 39 (reporting that sexual harassment cost
Federal Government $267 million over two years, including costs of reduced productivity, sick
leave, and replacing employees who left due to harassment); Kleiman, supra note 8, at C2
(asserting that employers who do not eliminate sexual harassment from workplace lose
productive workers, impair relations with customers, incur legal expenses, and suffer reduced
sales); Osborn, supranote 8, at 4B (noting results of 1988 study that estimated annual cost of
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Legal context
a.

Title VtW

Although sexual harassment has existed since women entered the
workplace, only recently have victims taken legal action against their
harassers. The first lawsuits alleging sex discrimination in the form
of sexual harassment did not enter the courts until the 1970s.2 2 As
a result of its recent development, sexual harassment jurisprudence
is relatively unsettled.2" The U.S. Supreme Court has decided only
one sexual harassment case,24 and although some trends exist among
the lower courts, there is a wide range of opinion.'
Since the mid-1970s, victims of sexual harassment have sought relief
under the theory that sexual harassment is sex discrimination and,
therefore, is in violation of title VII. 26 Title VII provides in part that

sexual harassment to each Fortune 500 company at $6.7 million, excluding litigation costs).
22. SeegenerallyDAVIDP. TWOMEY, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTUNITYLAW22 (2d ed. 1990)
(stating that first sexual harassment claims appeared in courts in mid-1970s); Gutek, supra note
3, at 335-36 (stating that sexual harassment gained "considerable attention" in mid-1970s);
Nelson, supra note 16, at 55 (declaring that "sexual harassment exploded upon the national
consciousness" in 1970s).
23. See MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 59-82 (summarizing sexual harassment cases that
demonstrate wide range of judicial interpretation during evolution of sexual harassment law).
24. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986) (holding that "hostile
environment" sexual harassment is violative of title VII). The Court recently heard arguments
in its second sexual harassment case, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992),
cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993). Harrisaddresses the question of whether a plaintiff must

demonstrate psychological injury to prove that harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of employment or to create a hostile work environment. Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., No. 3:89-0557, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20115, at *13-*15 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 28, 1990), afftd,
976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993). See also infranotes 54-57 and
accompanying text (explaining that sexual harassment claim includes threshold question of
severity and pervasiveness).
25. See MACKINNON, supranote 15, at 59-82 (showing trend in sexual harassment case law
and noting different definitions that courts use for sexual harassment).
26. See Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (denying claim
that sexual harassment was sex discrimination under title VII), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.
1977). Come was the first reported case involving a sexual harassment claim under title VII.
MACKINNON, supranote 15, at 60.
In addition to title VII relief, some victims of sexual harassment may establish causes of action
under state statutes and common law doctrines. Examples of these other legal avenues include:
state statutes banning sex-based employment discrimination; tort claims such as battery, assault,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress; criminal actions; and where the harasser is a
government employee, constitutional equal protection claims. SeeBARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID
D. KADUE, SEXuAL HARAsSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 12 (1992) (discussing overlap between
common-law actions and sexual discrimination actions); WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra
note 18, at 4-5 (discussing legal alternatives to title VII lawsuits); see also Arnold v. United States,
816 F.2d 1306, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding supervisor liable for battery for kissing and
fondling employee); Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205-06 (8th Cir. 1984)
(recognizing plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge where supervisor fired plaintiff for refusing
sexual advances); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585-86 (Ariz. 1987) (holding employer
liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress for failing to remedy sexual harassment
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it is unlawful for any employer 7 to discriminate on the basis of sex
with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges" of
employment. 8 Because a harasser selects his victim because she is
female and does not harass women and men equally,' the harasser
discriminates on the basis of sex."° In 1986, the Supreme Court
accepted the concept of sexual harassment as sex discrimination by
holding that the two forms of sexual harassment recognized by the
lower courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
were actionable as sex discrimination under title VII.

after victim complained).
27. "Employer" is defined as a person, which includes a business, with 15 or more
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1988). The full text of this section states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge an individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
29. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that typical
case involves male supervisor who makes sexual overtures only to female worker). According
to the court in Henson, because the supervisor did not make sexual advances to male employees,
it is "a simple matter for the plaintiff to prove that but for her sex, she would not have been
subjected to sexual harassment." Id.; see also MACKINNON, supranote 15, at 182 (arguing that
sexual harassment is discrimination based on sex because "[t]he behaviors to which women are
subjected in sexual harassment are behaviors specifically defined and directed toward the
characteristics which define women's sexuality- secondary sex characteristics and sex-role
behavior"); TWOME', supranote 22, at 23 (discussing sexual harassment as sex discrimination,
and citing leading case that holds that "[b]ut for her womanhood... [plaintiffs] participation
in sexual activity would never have been solicited") (quoting Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990
(D.C. Cir. 1977)).
Several courts and commentators have challenged the notion that sexual harassment is always
discrimination based on sex. Such challenges are based on a theoretical supervisor that harasses
men and women subordinates equally. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620
(6th Cir. 1986) (noting that sexual conduct equally offensive to female and male workers would
not create title VII claim because sexes were treated alike), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987);
Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (hypothesizing existence of situations where supervisor makes sexual
advances to both female and male workers and concluding that such cases would neither violate
title VII nor constitute sexual harassment on basis of sex because men and women are treated
alike); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws 357-59 (1992) (using example of bisexual harasser to demonstrate that application
of title VII to sexual harassment intolerably stretches statutory construction). But see Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that "[olnly by a reductio ad absurdum
could we imagine a case of harassment that is not sex discrimination-where a bisexual
supervisor harasses men and women alike") (citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55
(D.C. Cir. 1977)).
30. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (stating that "without question,
when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex"); Henson, 682 F.2d at 902 ("A pattern of sexual
harassment inflicted upon an employee because of her sex is a pattern of behavior that inflicts
disparate treatment upon a member of one sex with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment").
31. Met/tor, 477 U.S. at 66.
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Sexual harassment is defined legally as unwelcome 2 sexual
advances and other verbal 3 or physical conductM of a sexual or sexbased nature35 that alter the terms or conditions of the victim's
employment. Thus, sexual harassment plaintiffs must establish three
elements: (1) that the complained-of conduct was unwelcome; 36 (2)
that the harassment was on the basis of the victim's sex; 7 and (3)
that the harassment affected the victim's compensation or the terms,
conditions, or privileges of her employment.3 8 Plaintiffs must meet
additional requirements depending on the type of sexual harassment
that they allege. 9
The requirement that the advances or other sexual conduct be
unwelcome is central to the definition of sexual harassment.40
Conduct is unwelcome "in the sense that the [victim] did not solicit

32. See id at 68 (stating that gravamen of sexual harassment claim is that alleged sexual
advances were "unwelcome"). Fora discussion of the "unwelcome" requirement, see infranotes
42-44 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1989)
(finding that co-workers sexually harassed plaintiff by using public address system to direct
obscenities and other lewd and suggestive comments toward plaintiff); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (explaining that harassment of plaintiff "took the form of extremely
vulgar and offensive sexually related epithets addressed to and employed about" plaintiff). The
court in Katz further noted that "[t]he words used were ones widely recognized as not only
improper but as intensely degrading, deriving their power to wound not only from their
meaning but also from 'the disgust and violence they express phonetically.'" Id.; see alsoHenson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 899-901 (lth Cir. 1982) (finding that supervisor sexually
harassed plaintiff and co-worker by "subject[ing] them to numerous harangues of demeaning
sexual inquiries and vulgarities").
34. See, e.g., Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d
685, 686 n.1 (7th Cir.) (explaining how co-worker approached victim from behind as she was
working and grabbed her breasts), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.,
881 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that supervisor showed plaintiff racist pornographic
pictures); Waltman, 875 F.2d at 471 (reviewing evidence of sexually explicit drawings, sexually
oriented calendars on walls, co-worker sticking tongue in plaintiff's ear, and co-worker pinching
plaintiff's breast).
35. Plaintiffs have been successful in sexual harassment lawsuits where the harassment
complained of was sex-based, rather than sexual. See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010,
1013-14 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that calling plaintiff cruel nickname and urinating into gas
tank of plaintiffs automobile constituted sex-based harassment and therefore was actionable
sexual harassment despite lack of sexual nature); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415
(10th Cir. 1987) (rejecting argument that sexual harassment must be in form of sexual advances
or other conduct with sexual overtones). The court in Hicks held that "harassment or other
unequal treatment of an employee or group of employees that would not occur but for the sex
of the employee or employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal
condition of employment under Title VII." Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1415.
36. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that harassment
be "unwelcome").
37. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (noting that harassment must be sexbased).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1988) (defining unlawful employment practices for
employers).
39. See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text (discussing two forms of sexual harassment-quid pro quo and hostile environment).
40. See supra note 32 (noting central importance of unwelcome requirement).

200

THE AMERICAN UNrvERsrY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:191

or incite it, and in the sense that the [victim] regarded the conduct
as undesirable or offensive."4 1 Thus, the determination whether
conduct is unwelcome requires a subjective inquiry into the victim's
perception of the alleged harasser's conduct. 42 Because "unwelcome" is subjectively defined and therefore difficult to prove, 43 the
courts look to the victim's conduct for objectively verifiable indicia of
her subjective state of mind.'
Under title VII, courts recognize two forms of sexual harassment:
quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment.45 Quid
pro quo sexual harassment occurs when the harasser makes an
employment decision based upon the victim's submission to, or
rejection of, his sexual demands.' Because it conditions an economic benefit on the victim's compliance with the harasser's sexual
demands, quid pro quo harassment violates title VII by affecting the
victim's compensation and the terms of her employment.47 Thus, a
plaintiff alleging quid pro quo harassment must show that her
harasser withheld an employment benefit because she refused his

41. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
42. SeeMeritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986) (describing "unwelcomeness"
requirement as whether alleged victim actually found conduct unwelcome); Waitman v.
International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 484 (5th Cir. 1989) (JonesJ, dissenting) (stating that
unwelcomeness requirement "lends a subjective component to the definition [of sexual
harassment]") (footnote omitted); Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (stating that definition of sexual
harassment depends on plaintiff's perception of harasser's conduct as undesirable and
offensive).
43. Meitor, 477 U.S. at 68 (noting difficulty of proving that conduct is unwelcome).
44. See id. ("The correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the
alleged sexual advances were unwelcome .... ."). It is important to distinguish "unwelcome"
from "involuntary." A victim of harassment may voluntarily submit to sexual activity with her
harasser without welcoming her harasser's advances. See id. (noting that "[t]he correct inquiry
is... not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary," but rather if
victim's conductshowed that sexual advances were notwelcome); WAGNER, supranote 3, at 19-21
(defining "unwelcome" as unsolicited and offensive conduct to which victim may voluntarily
acquiesce, and "involuntary" as undesirable conduct endured without submission).
45. See, e.g., Meritor,477 U.S. at 65-66 (permitting action for hostile environment harassment
under title VII); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that although
legislative history provides little guidance in interpreting conduct, courts have defined two kinds
of sexual harassment); Tunis v. Coming Glass Works, 747 F. Supp. 951, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(asserting that plaintiff may proceed under title VII for quid pro quo and hostile environment
sexual harassment), afftd, 930 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1991); Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp.
369, 380 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (stating that U.S. Supreme Court explicitly recognized that sexual
harassment can occur in two forms: quid pro quo and hostile environment).
46. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992)
[hereinafter EEOC Guidelines] (explaining that quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when
harasser uses victim's submission or rejection of sexual advances as grounds for employment
decision); MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 32 (defining quid pro quo harassment as explicit
exchange of sex for employment benefit).
47. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that male
supervisor's dismissal of female employee in retaliation for refusal of sexual advances constituted
sexual discrimination because it "created an artificial barrier to employment which was placed
before one gender and not the other").
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advances or, in the alternative, granted such a benefit because she
complied. For example, a woman whose supervisor says that he will
promote her only if she has sex with him is a victim of quid pro quo
48
harassment.
Hostile environment harassment occurs where the harasser's
conduct "unreasonably interfer[es] with an individual's work
performance or creat[es] an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment."49 By converting the victim's workplace into
a hostile environment, this type of sexual harassment affects the
conditions of the victim's employment in violation of title VII ° The
harassment need not create any tangible economic detriment to be

48. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that typical
case of quid pro quo sexual harassment involves harasser using authority to compel subordinate
to submit to sexual demands); see also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 984-85 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(reviewing claim where supervisor fired plaintiff for rejecting sexual advances); Miller v. Bank
of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (reviewing plaintiff's claim that supervisor
promised promotion if plaintiff were sexually cooperative), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
49. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 46, § 1604.11(a) (3). Most courts have embraced this
definition of hostile environment sexual harassment. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66
(approving EEOC's definition of hostile environment sexual harassment and recognizing that
hostile environment harassment violates title VII); Ellison, 924 F.2d at 876-78 (interpreting Mentor
as recognizing hostile environment sexual harassment where offensive behavior unreasonably
interferes with victim's work performance or creates abusive employment environment); Henson,
682 F.2d at 902 (recognizing hostile environment sexual harassment as gender discrimination).
Indeed, a leading commentator describes this form of non-quid pro quo sexual harassment as
something which "simply makes the work environment unbearable." MACKINON, supra note
15, at 40.
Some courts require a showing that the effects of the harassment, rather than the harassment
itself, were severe and pervasive. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619 (6th Cir.
1986) (holding that prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment exists only if
plaintiff proves that "intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment . . . affected
seriously the psycho logical [sic] well-being of the plaintiff'), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
Such a requirement, however, would withhold relief from a victim of hostile environment sexual
harassment until she became psychologically debilitated, at which point relief might be too late.
See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878 (contending that victims need not suffer harassment until they are
psychologically injured). This result seems completely contrary to the aim of title VII, which is
to protect the psychological, as well as the economic, well-being of employees who suffer
discrimination. See Met/tor, 477 U.S. at 64 (asserting that "congressional intent [of title VII was]
'to strike at the entire spectrum'" of gender discrimination, including psychological injury as well
as economic loss) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (1978) (citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))); see
also Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78 (arguing that court in Rabiduemisinterpreted Mentor and holding
that "Title VII's protection of employees from sex discrimination comes into play long before
the point where victims of sexual harassment require psychiatric assistance").
50. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (stating that sexual harassment is actionable when it is
"sufficiently severe or pervasive" to create hostile work environment by altering conditions of
employment); see also Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(finding sexual harassment in violation of title VlIwhere conditions ofvictim's employmentwere
affected because of her sex), aft'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cet. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987). The court in Rabidue emphasized the importance of the inclusion of the word
"conditions" in the statute as evidence that sexual harassment is gender discrimination under
title VII. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 428. The court in Rabidue explained that "where a female
employee is subject to sex harassment, she is subject to a condition of employment that is
invidiously discriminatory as opposed to the conditions of employment of male employees." Id.
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Because hostile environment harassment involves
actionable."
neither a threat to damage, nor a promise to improve, the victim's
employment status, co-workers as well as supervisors can commit
hostile environment harassment.5 2 For example, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that hostile environment sexual
harassment existed where a woman's male co-workers continuously
wrote sexual graffiti about her, propositioned her for sex, and
displayed pornography in the workplace.53
To prove a case of hostile environment sexual harassment, a
plaintiff must show that the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment or create
To determine whether the
an abusive working environment.'
harassment meets the threshold requirement of severity or pervasiveness, the trend among the U.S. Courts of Appeal is to use a twoFirst, the court employs an objective test to
pronged analysis.5

51. See Meitor, 477 U.S. at 64 (rejecting argument that plaintiff must show tangible
economic loss in order to prove title VII violation). The Court in Meitoremphasized that "the
language of title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. The phrase
'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment." Id. (quoting
Manhart; 435 U.S. at 707 n.13 (citing Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198)).
52. Cf. Sally E. Barker & Loretta K. Haggard, A Labor Union's Duties and PotentialLiabilities
Arising out of Coworker Complaints of Sexual Harassment 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 135, 141
(1992) (arguing that hostile environment harassment is predominantly between co-workers);
Jonathan S. Monat & Angel Gomez, DecisionalStandards Used by Arbitrators in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 1986 ]LAB. LJ. 712, 713 (stating that co-worker harassment is primarily hostile environment
sexual harassment because co-worker cannot grant or deny promotion or pay raise to another
co-worker).
53. Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 476 (5th Cir. 1989).
54. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 ("For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create
an abusive working environment.'") (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
55. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that trier of
fact in hostile environment case should "adopt the perspective of a reasonable person's reaction
to a similar environment under essentially like or similar circumstances" and also consider
whether plaintiff was actually offended), cert. denied 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). The court in Rabidue
was the first to adopt the two-pronged objective and subjective analysis, and the case is often
cited by courts that subsequently adopted the test. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895
F.2d 1469, 1482-83 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that plaintiff must show that reasonable person of
same sex would find defendant's conduct harassing and that plaintiff actually perceived it as
harassment); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying two-part
analysis considering effect of defendant's conduct on reasonable person and on plaintiff);
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989) (adopting Rabidue's two-part
combined objective and subjective analysis).
The court in Rabiduz, however, made several errors in applying the test. First, the court stated
that consideration must be given to the "lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment
of the workplace both before and after the plaintiff's introduction into its environs, coupled with
the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that environment."
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. Thus, Rabidue suggested that an employee cannot state a claim of
sexual harassment if the work environment was hostile from the start of her employment This
limitation on hostile environment claims is contrary to the Supreme Court's finding that "[t]itle
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determine whether the conduct in question would be sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the employment conditions of a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances. 6 The court then
examines the plaintiff's subjective experience to discern whether 5the
7
harassment actually altered the plaintiff's employment conditions.
b.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

To advance title VII's prohibition on employment discrimination,
Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)5 8 and vested it with the power to receive, investigate, settle,

VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; see Rabidue,805 F.2d at 626-27 (Keith,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with majority's consideration of
prevailing work environment and suggestion that female employees assume risk of working in
offensive environment and stating that "no woman should be subjected to an environment
where her sexual dignity and reasonable sensibilities are visually, verbally or physically assaulted
as a matter of prevailing male prerogative").
Second, the Rabidue majority considered the complained-of sexually oriented posters "in the
context of a society that condones and publicly features and commercially exploits open displays
of written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time television, at the cinema, and
in other public places" and finds their effect on the plaintiff's environment to be de minimis.
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622. This analysis is faulty because it ignored the distinction between the
workplace and other settings. While the subjugation of women may be commonplace elsewhere,
title VII forbids it within the workplace. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1988) (clarifying
prohibition of employment practices that discriminate on basis of sex). In addition, the court
in Rabidueerred by measuring the alleged harassment against a sexist norm rather than against
the nondiscriminatory ideal implicit in title VII. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 65 (interpreting title VII
as creating right to discrimination-free workplace).
56. &e, e.g., Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482-83 (stating that court must consider effect of alleged
harassment on objective reasonable person as one element of test for hostile environment);
Brooms, 881 F.2d at 419 (identifying first part of two-pronged test as effect of defendant's
conduct on reasonable person); Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (describing first element of test as
effect of alleged harassment on reasonable person in same circumstances).
Some courts and judges insist that the objective test consider the victim's gender because to
do otherwise would perpetuate "ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the
offenders." Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith,J., dissenting); see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,
878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (measuring hostile conduct based on woman's perspective because malebiased reasonable person standard creates "risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of
discrimination"). Similarly, courts that apply a one-prong objective test have adopted reasonable
woman or reasonable victim standards in recognition of the inherent differences in the way that
men and women may interpret the same encounter. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-79 (adopting
reasonable woman standard and stating that "[c]onduct that many men consider unobjectionable may offend many women"); cf Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir.
1988) (discussing conduct that male supervisor may find innocuous but that female subordinate
may perceive as offensive and harassing).
57. See, e.g., Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483-84 (emphasizing importance of subjective element
of test for hostile environment sexual harassment); Brooms, 881 F.2d at 419 (describing second
prong of "sufficiently severe or pervasive" test as "the actual effect upon the particular plaintiff
bringing the claim"); Paroline, 879 F.2d at 105 (requiring plaintiff to show that harassment
"interfered with her ability to perform her work or significantly affected her psychological wellbeing"); Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (stating that in addition to proving impact of offending
conduct on reasonable person, plaintiffmust "demonstrate that she was actually offended by the
defendant's conduct").
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1988) (creating EEOC and defining its composition).
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and litigate title VII claims.5 9 Congress chose "[c]ooperation and
voluntary compliance" as the primary means of eliminating employment discrimination.' As a result, the EEOC has no direct enforcement powers; instead, it employs informal means to eliminate violative
employment practices.6" To promote the extrajudicial resolution of
title VII claims, the law requires complainants to file charges with the
EEOC6 2 and prohibits initiation of a lawsuit in court before completion of the EEOC complaint process. 3 The ultimate power to
enforce title VII rests with the federal courts."
Upon receipt of a harassment claim, the EEOC investigates the
charges.65 Where it finds reasonable cause to believe that the charge
is true, the EEOC has the authority to "eliminate any such alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion."66 Should these informal methods fail,
the EEOC may file a civil lawsuit against the employer in federal
court. ' If the EEOC decides not to file such a lawsuit, it grants the
complainant the right to sue.'9 Only then may a complainant file a
lawsuit against her employer.

59. Id. § 2000e-5(a) to (b).
60. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1973) (discussing Congress'
preferred methods of handling employment discrimination cases).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (endowing EEOC with power to utilize "informal methods
of conference, conciliation, and persuasion" to end unlawful employment practices); see also
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44 (stating that by vesting EEOC with only informal enforcement powers
and by placing ultimate enforcement power in federal courts, Congress designed title VII
complaint process to promote settlement and discourage litigation).
62. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) (requiring that complainant file complaint with EEOC within
180 days after alleged unlawful employment practice).
63. See, e.g., Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47 (stating that prerequisites for bringing title VII claim
in federal court are met when plaintiff files claim with EEOC and receives and acts on notice
from EEOC of right to sue); Movement for Opportunity & Equality v. General Motors Corp.,
622 F.2d 1235, 1238-40 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that to maintain suit against employer under
title VII, plaintiff must file charges with EEOC and must receive letter of right to sue from
EEOC); Wells v. Sherwood Medical Indus., Inc., 549 F.2d 1170, 1171 n.1 (8th Cir. 1977)
(holding that complainant can bring title VII action after she has filed charges with EEOC, has
acquired right to sue from EEOC, and acts upon that right); Local 179, United Textile Workers
v. Federal Paper Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849,850-51 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that plaintiff pursuing
lawsuit under title VII must file charges with EEOC and receive and act upon notice from EEOC
of her right to sue).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (endowing courts with power to grant equitable relief to
prevailing title VII plaintiff); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44 (stating that "final responsibility for
enforcement of title VII is vested with federal courts").
65. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (explaining EEOCinvestigatory duties regarding complaints).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 2000e-5(f) (1).
68. Id.
69. See id. (withholding notice of right to sue until after EEOC declines); see also supranote
63 and accompanying text (reviewing cases that discuss complainant's right to pursue civil suit
against employer for title VII violation).
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EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment

In 1980, the EEOC published sexual harassment guidelines 7 that
established sexual harassment as a violation of title VII,71 defined73
sexual harassment,72 and outlined principles for employer liability.
According to the EEOC guidelines, employers are strictly liable for
sexual harassment committed by their "agents and supervisory
employees" regardless of the employer's knowledge or lack of
knowledge of the harassment. 7 By imposing strict liability for
harassment committed by supervisors and agents, the guidelines
adhere to "the general standard of employer liability with respect to
agents and supervisory employees" and are consistent with title VII
case law.75
With respect to harassment among co-workers, the guidelines
prescribe employer liability where the employer has actual or
constructive knowledge of the harassment.7 6 The employer may
escape liability by showing that it "took immediate and appropriate
corrective action" in response to the harassment. 77 The "appropriate
78
action" requirement is ambiguous and confusing for employers.
In response to requests for clarification received during the comment
period following publication of the proposed guidelines, however, the
requirement to the courts
EEOC deferred further definition of the
79
for future case-by-case determinations.
The EEOC guidelines are merely advisory. Title VII authorizes the
EEOC to promulgate procedural regulations.8 " The guidelines on

70. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 46, § 1604.11.
71. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 46, § 1604.11(a).
72. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 46, § 1604.11(a) (defining sexual harassment as
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature" that interfere with individual's employment conditions).
73. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 46, § 1604.11(c)-(d) (describing conditions under which
employers are liable for supervisors' acts of sexual harassment).
74. EEOC Guidelines, supranote 46, § 1604.11(c).
75. Amendment to Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676,
74,676 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.RL § 1604.11 (1992)).
76. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 46, § 1604.11(d) (outlining conditions under which
employer is liable for sexual harassment among employees).
77. EEOC Guidelines, supranote 46, § 1604.11(d).
78. See Amendment to Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676,
74,676 (1980) (discussing response to publication ofproposed guidelines and stating that EEOC
received numerous requests for clarification and further definition of "appropriate action").
79. See id. ("What is considered to be 'appropriate' [and, therefore, sufficient to insulate
employer from liability] will be seen in the context of specific cases through Commission
decisions.").
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 ("The Commission shall have authority from time to time to
issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this
subchapter.") (emphasis added).
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sexual harassment are not procedural and therefore are not authorized by Congress to have the force of law. The guidelines are thus
"not controlling upon the courts";8" rather, they "constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance."8 3
3.

Judicial stance on employer liability

The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved the issue of
employer liability for sexual harassment.8 4 In Meitor Savings Bank v.
Vinson,85 however, the Court rejected strict liability for sexual
harassment committed by supervisors in favor of some undetermined
version of agency liability.8 6 With regard to harassment between coworkers where the harasser is not an agent of the employer, the

81. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 & n.20 (1976) (discussing EEOC
guidelines on employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth and according them less
weight than regulations that have force of law). The Court in Gilbert noted that "Congress, in
enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations
pursuant to that Title," other than procedural regulations, and that "courts properly may accord
less weight to such guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has declared
shall have the force of law." Id.
82. Id. at 14142 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
83. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1985) (quoting Gilber 429 U.S. at 142
(quoting Skidmore 323 U.S. at 140)). Although the Court in Mentor relies on the EEOC
guidelines throughout its opinion, the Court painstakingly avoids reference to its proclamation
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1970), that EEOC guidelines are "entitled
to great deference." Instead, the Court in Meritorquotes Griggs in its characterization of the
guidelines as an "'administrative interpretation of the act by the enforcing agency... .'" Meitor,
477 U.S. at 65 (quoting Grigs,401 U.S. at 433-34). The quoted phrase is only the first half of
a sentence in the Griggs opinion that is directly relevant to the discussion in Meritor. The
complete sentence reads: "The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency
is entitled to great deference" Gnidgs, 401 U.S. at 433-34 (emphasis added). By this omission, the
Court expresses its approval of the guidelines, but deliberately stops short of adopting them.
Had the Court adopted the guidelines, the issue of employer liability would be nearer to a
resolution. Justice Marshall, who concurred in the judgment but wrote separately, viewed the
guidelines as deserving great deference and relied on them to resolve the issue of employer
liability. Meritor,477 U.S. at 74-78 (Marshall,J., concurring). See infra note 86 (discussingJustice
Marshall's concurrence).
84. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 72 (declining to issue definitive rule on employer liability).
85. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
86. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (holding that lower court "erred
in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their
supervisors"). The Court in Meritorarrived at this conclusion by inferring legislative intent from
the language of the statute: "Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of
an employer.., surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which
employers under Title VII are to be held responsible." Id. (citation omitted). The Court in
Meritorfurther interpreted the statutory language as suggesting that Congress intended "courts
to look to agency principles for guidance" in deciding employer liability, and that lack of notice
"does not necessarily" protect an employer from liability for sexual harassment. Id.
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment but wrote a separate opinion addressing the
question of employer liability, which he believed the majority improperly left unresolved. Id.
at 74. On this issue, Justice Marshall stated that the EEOC guidelines are deserving of "great
deference." Id. (citing Griggs,401 U.S. at 433-34). Justice Marshall further stated that he would
adopt the guidelines because they follow title VII and general federal labor law. Id. at 75.
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majority in Meritorwas silent. Since Meritor,the U.S. Courts of Appeal
that have considered employer liability have had difficulty developing
87
a standard for employer liability.
Although the courts are not bound to follow the EEOC guidelines, 8 many lower courts have found the guidelines useful and have

turned to them for guidance on employer liability for sexual
harassment.89 In fact, the trend in most courts is to hold employers
liable for failing to remedy or prevent sexual harassment of which the

employer knew or should have known.'

Similarly, many circuit

courts have held employers liable where they had actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial
action. 91
Some courts have defined appropriate remedial action as action
"reasonably calculated to end the harassment."9 2 This standard,
while intended to further define employer liability, provides the

87. See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515 (9th Cir. 1989) (reviewing status of
case law regarding employer liability for sexual harassment and stating that courts of appeal have
been unable to develop clear standards since Mentor); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 900-01 (1st Cir. 1988) (endeavoring to extract employer liability rule from Meitor);
Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting ambiguity of existing
employer liability rule).
88. See supranote 81 and accompanying text (discussing guidelines' lack of congressional
authorization and effect on guidelines' status as legal authority).
89. SeeHenson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 n.7 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that many
courts have found EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment valuable in resolving issue of employer
liability); see also Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that
EEOC guidelines "have been influential with the courts, which are fond of paraphrasing the
formula" for employer liability established in guidelines).
90. HaciendaHotel, 881 F.2d at 1515-16; see, e.g., Hall 842 F.2d at 1016 (holding employer
liable for hostile environment sexual harassment by nonsupervisory employee because employer
had actual knowledge of sexual insults and should have known of other incidents); cf. Hunter
v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421-22 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding in racial harassment
case that employer is liable if it has reason to know that one of its employees is being harassed
by others on basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin and employer does nothing to end
harassment).
91. See, e.g., Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1987)
(stating that employer would be liable where prompt remedial action did not follow realization
of sexual harassment); Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting
that plaintiff in titie VII sexual harassment case must prove that employer knew or should have
known of harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action); Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (asserting that employer is liable if it does not take
prompt, adequate action after receiving actual or constructive notice of sexual harassment);
Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 (establishing employer liability where employer does not remedy sexual
harassment shortly after learning of it or after employer should have known that it existed);
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (applying EEOC guidelines, including
provision allowing employer to escape liability by taking immediate and appropriate corrective
action).
92. Katz, 709 F.2d at 256. The court in Katz held that an employer may rebut a plaintiff's
showing of employer liability by "pointing to prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to
end the harassment." ld.; see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that
employer's action must be reasonably calculated to end harassment and must persuade
individual harassers to discontinue sexual harassment).
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employer with little practical guidance in handling a harassment
situation as it occurs. The courts often focus on the success or failure
of the action in stopping the harassment when reviewing an
employer's actions to determine if the employer should be held
liable.93 The courts find that the employer's actions were remedial
or reasonably calculated to end the harassment where the actions
actually stopped the harassment.94
Employers do not share the courts' retrospective vantage. Instead,
they must endeavor to predict the harasser's response to their
disciplinary action. By focusing on the success of the remedial action,
the reasonably calculated and prompt remedial standards may
encourage the employer to administer the harshest of punishments.95 Permanently removing the harasser from the workplace is
the only action that is certain to end the harassment; therefore, it is
a sure way of satisfying the requirement and avoiding employer

93. See Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting fact
that harasser's conduct was more offensive after meetings with supervisor as evidence that
employer failed to take remedial action); Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 778 (9th Cir.
1992) (stating that "[a]ction is 'corrective' only if it contributes to the elimination of the
problem," and interpreting title VII as requiring employer to intervene promptly and effectively
to end sexual harassment); Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882 (holding that reasonableness of employer's
remedy depends on its effectiveness in ending harassment and that court, in determining
adequacy of remedy, may consider its deterrent effect); Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections
Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding employer liable because it failed to remedy
harassment); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (l1th Cir. 1989)
(identifying fact that harassment ended after employer took remedial action as especially
important in determining whether employer's actions were sufficient to avoid liability to victim);
Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding employer not liable to victim
by relying in part on fact that no further complaints were filed after employer reprimanded
harasser); Foster v. Township of Hillside, 780 F. Supp. 1026, 1039 (D.Nj.) ("Courts that have
decided the issue, have placed great weight on whether the harassment ended after remedial
steps were taken."), aJffd without opinion, 977 F.2d 567 (3d Gir. 1992); Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1531 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that employer can defend
itself against liability by showing that remedial action succeeded in ending harassment);
LiNDEmANN & KADUE, supra note 26, at 195 (discussing whether employer's actions were
sufficient to rebut employer liability and stating that factual question whether sexual harassment
ended is particularly important). But see Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir.
1989) (stating that "a court should not focus solely upon whether the remedial activity ultimately
succeeded, but instead should determine whether the employer's total response was reasonable
under the circumstances as then existed"). For criticism of the Brooms approach, see Ellison, 924
F.2d at 882 n.17 (stating that Brooms' reasonable employer test "runs the risk of reinforcing any
prevailing level of discrimination by employers and fails to focus directly on the best way to
eliminate sexual harassment from the workplace").
94. See supranote 93 and accompanying text (discussing judicial approach to determining
whether employer actions are remedial or reasonably calculated to end harassment).
95. Cf Becky Leamon, Note, Employers' Liability for Failure to Prevent Sexual Harassment:
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 55 MO. L REV. 803, 815 (1990) (stating that case holding employer
liable for failing to prevent sexual harassment may cause employers to discharge harassers after
only one incident of harassment to protect themselves against future liability).
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liability.9" As a result of such action, however, the employer may
find itself the defendant in a wrongful discharge lawsuit or arbitra97
tion.
B.
1.

Wrongful Termination

Social context

Like sexual harassment, wrongful termination of employment can
be devastating to the employee. For most working people, jobs are
a primary source of identity, self-esteem, and social life." Loss of
employment, therefore, often causes psychological distress" and
economic hardship."
Recognition of the damaging effects of
discharge from employment provides some of the impetus for the
movement to abandon the doctrine of employment at will and for the
development of a cause of action for wrongful termination. 0 1
2.

Legal context
a.

Employment at will

The traditional common-law rule of employment at will allowed
employers, absent a written contract stating otherwise, to discharge
employees for good cause, bad cause, or no cause.'02 The rule was

96. See Intlekofer, 973 F.2d at 786 (Wiggins,J., dissenting) (arguing that requiring employer
to meet excessively stringent requirement to avoid liability will result in employer punishing
alleged harassers who are not guilty and will expose employer to risk of lawsuit by alleged
offender).
97. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (listing cases where employees discharged for
sexual harassment sued their employers for wrongful discharge). Employees discharged for
sexual harassment also may sue their employer for various tort claims, such as defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Barker & Haggard, supra note 52, at 142
(observing that stigma associated with discharge for sexual harassment prompts accused
individuals to sue their employers for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
98. See Tobias, supra note 12, at 181 (relating importance of employment to sense of
identity, self-esteem, and social life); Employer Opportunisn, supra note 1, at 511 (arguing that
employment provides workers with both economic and personal well-being); see also WkILER,
supra note 13, at 3 (describing importance of jobs to individuals' social, psychological, and
economic well-being).
99. See Tobias, supra note 12, at 181-82 (describing psychological and social suffering of
discharged employees).
100. See Tobias, supra note 12, at 181-82 (discussing effects of termination of income and
benefits, and noting that discharged workers will have difficulty obtaining future employment).
101. See WEULER, supra note 13, at 49 (noting that one component of argument for
abandonment of employment at will attacks employer's ability to destroy employee's personal
and financial stability).
102. SeeBrown, supra note 1, at 780 (stating that employment at will allowed termination of
employment by either party at any time and for any reason); John P. Hoel, Note, Labor
Arbitration andState Wrongful DischargeActions: Due Proce or RemedialDoubleDipping,1989J. DISP.
RESOL. 179, 184 (stating that in late 19th century, courts upheld discharge from employment
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based on the laissez-faire theory of economics, prevalent in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that held employment at will
necessary to economic efficiency.' 3 Laissez-faire economics, however, assumed that employers and employees had equal bargaining
power, an assumption that modem courts and commentators
recognize as false.'
By the middle of the twentieth century, the
doctrine of employment at will was in decline and scholars and
employee-rights advocates were calling for its abolition. 5 The
courts assisted the movement by creating exceptions to the traditional
common-law doctrine"0 6 based on public policy,0 7 contract theo-

regardless of whether termination was for good cause, bad cause, or no cause); see also supra
note 13 and accompanying text (discussing employment-at-will doctrine and evolution of its
repudiation).
103. See Brown, supranote 1, at 780 (claiming that economic freedom central to laissez-faire
theory precluded any legal restrictions on employment terms, including constraints on
termination of employment, and concluding that employment at will was natural result of such
economic beliefs); Tobias, supranote 12, at 179 (maintaining that laissez-faire theory promoted
notion that economic efficiency required employers to have freedom to discharge employees
at will); Employer Opportunism, supra note 1, at 510 (stating that employment at will rests on
principle of economic freedom).
104. See WAYNE N. OUTTEN & NOAH A. KINIGSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES 28-29 (1983)
(arguing that employment at will rests on assumption that discharged employee will easily find
other employment, stating that modem society recognizes hardships caused by loss of
employment, and concluding that assumption that employers and employees have equal
bargaining power is fallacious); 9A INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RTS. MANUAL (BNA) § 505:2 (1991)
(describing argument that freedom of contract-basis for laissez-faire theory-does not exist
amid modem economic reality of widely disparate bargaining powers between employers and
employees); Alfred W. Blumrosen, EmployerDiscipline: United States Rpm, 18 RuTGERS L. REV.
428, 432-33 (1964) (attributingjudicial renunciation of employment at will to discontinuation
of "judicial policy decision to free capital for industrial expansion" and to judicial response to
changed expectations of contracting parties); Employer Opportunism, supra note 1, at 510-11
(stating that in recent decades commentators have argued that reality of unequal bargaining
powers between employers and employees requires abolition of employment at will).
105. See Tobias, supra note 12, at 183 (discussing movement to abolish employment at will
during 1960s); see also WEILER, supra note 13, at 49 & n.6 (stating that arguments against
employment at will and in favor of protection against unfair dismissals emerged in law review
articles in late 1960s).
106. See Blumrosen, supra note 104, at 432-33 (observing movement away from employment.
at-will doctrine and nascent willingness of courts to interpret facts and circumstances
surrounding employment contract in manner antithetic to employment at will); Tobias, supra
note 12, at 183 (arguing thatjudiciary responded to public opposition to employment at will by
creating exceptions); supranote 13 and accompanying text (listing cases in which courts fashion
exceptions to employment at will).
107. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1973) (finding
wrongful discharge where employer terminated plaintiff for filing worker's compensation claim,
and reasoning that permitting such termination would undermine public policy underlying
worker's compensation legislation); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 514-16 (Or. 1975) (allowing
plaintiff discharged for serving jury duty to recover for wrongful discharge based on public
policy exception to employment at will, and relying on "'societal interests' in having citizens
serve on juries" as source of public policy); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275-76
(W. Va. 1978) (granting recovery to plaintiff discharged for reporting employer's violation of
state law to authorities because termination undermined public policy established by violated
law); see also Hoel, supranote 102, at 185 (discussing landmark public policy exception case in
which employer discharged employee for disobeying instructions to commit perjury when
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ries,'08 and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. °9
In addition to the common-law exceptions to employment at will,
collective bargaining agreements, individual employment contracts,
and state legislation protect some employees from groundless
discharge. Beginning in the 1930s, union collective bargaining
agreements have required just cause for termination.110 Today, just
cause provisions are standard in collective bargaining agreements."'
Government employees possess similar protection from termination
without just cause. 1 All fifty states and the District of Columbia
now recognize causes of action for wrongful termination based on
one of the above-mentioned provisions or theories. 13 One state has

testifying before state legislature) (citing Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local
396, 344 P.2d 25, 26-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)).
108. Courts have inferred contractual provisions requiring just cause for termination. See
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 926 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding employer liable
for wrongful termination where plaintiff based claim on implied contractual covenant of good
faith and fair dealing); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880,885 (Mich. 1980)
(asserting that contractual provision requiring just cause for termination may be inferred from
employee's legitimate expectations based on employer's stated policy); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil
Co., 766 P.2d 280, 284 (N.M. 1988) (noting that several jurisdictions have imposed implied
contractual duty on employers after employers told employees that they would only terminate
for just cause), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109 (1989); see also Note, ProtectingAt WillEmployees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1828-29
(1980) (noting that some commentators have analogized at-will employment contract to
boilerplate contract containing unconscionable terms and explaining that analogy rests on
disparate bargaining powers of parties and "take-it-or-leave-it basis" on which employment is
usually offered).
109. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725-26 (Ct. App. 1980)
(recognizing cause of action for wrongful termination based on covenant of good faith and fair
dealing implied by longevity of satisfactory service by employee); Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977) (holding that written contract for
employment at will contained implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that
termination in bad faith was breach of employment contract); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316
A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (concluding that termination of employment in bad faith is contrary
to interests of economic system and public good); see also OuTrEN & KiNIsTziN, supranote 104,
at 34 (discussing covenant of good faith and fair dealing and its use as exception to employment
at will).
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in all contracts. RESrATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONrTSA
§ 205 (1981). Accordingly, this covenant imposes on all parties a duty
of"[g]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract [and] emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party, it
excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate
community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness." Id. § 205 cmt a. But see English
v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983) (refusing to recognize general duty of good faith
and fair dealing in all contracts).
110. See Delmendo, supranote 13, at 832 (discussing history ofjust cause concept and stating
that union collective bargaining agreements began including just cause provisions in 1930s).
111. See Tobias, supra note 12, at 180 (stating that most labor agreements contain specific
just cause provisions).
112. See Delmendo, supra note 13, at 831 (stating that government employees, like union
employees, enjoy protection from employment at will).
113. See Brown, supranote 1, at 779, 781-82, 787-88 (reviewing theories under which states
have allowed wrongful termination actions).
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even enacted legislation requiring cause for termination of employment 14 and several other states have proposed similar legislan
tion. 1
b. Just cause
Just cause is a vague requirement for which no uniform, judicially
established meaning exists. 16 Some courts define just cause as "a
fair and honest cause or reason,""' "a good reason,"118 or a reason that is not arbitrary, capricious, unjustified, or discriminatory."'
Decisions vary as to whether dismissal for sexual harassment
constitutes termination for just cause. In one case, for example, a
district court judge considered a male employee's sexual comments
to a female customer regarding his wife's body to be an adequate
basis for discharge. 2 In another case, an arbitrator held that a

114.

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1991). The Montana law defines good cause as

"reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job
duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business reason." Id. § 39-2-

903(5). Puerto Rico also has ajust cause statute. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185a (1985). The
Puerto Rican statute enumerates six situations that constitute good cause, two of which are
relevant to sexual harassment. Id. § 185b(a)-(f). These two situations are those in which "the
worker indulges in a pattern of improper or disorderly conduct" and where the worker is guilty
of "repeated violations... of the reasonable rules and regulations established for the operations
of the establishment, provided [that] a written copy thereof has been timely furnished to the
employee." Id. § 185b(a), (c).
115. See Me. S.B. 230, 116th Leg., 1st Sess. (1993) (requiring good cause for termination of
employee who has worked for employer for over one year); Mo. H.B. 236, 87th Leg. Assembly,
1st Sess. (1993) (declaring discharge wrongful if it is not for good cause and employee has
completed probationary period); Nev. A.B. 343, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993) (requiring good
cause for termination of employment); N.H. H.B. 513, 153d Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (1993)
(prohibiting certain employers from terminating certain employees without good cause); N.M.
H.B. 914, 41st Leg., 1st Sess. (1993) (creating procedures for termination of employees,
including written notice ofjust cause); N.Y. A.B. 3535, 215th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1993)
(requiring good cause for termination of alien employees who are legally restricted from other
employment); Wash. H.B. 1023, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993) (requiring good cause for
termination of employee close to pension or other benefit qualifications); see also Employer
Opportunism, supranote 1, at 515 n.20 (stating that California, Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan,
NewYork, and Pennsylvania have considered legislation similar to Montana's just cause statute).
116. See Delmendo, supra note 13, at 831 (arguing that courts have not clearly defined "just
cause"); WrongfulDischarge: A PanelDiscussion,6 LAB. LAW. 319, 320 (1990) (hereinafter Panel
Discussion] (discussing argument that just cause is flexible, elusive, and manipulable concept).
117. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 250 Cal. Rptr. 195, 212 (Ct. App. 1988); Baldwin v. Sisters
of Providence, Inc., 769 P.2d 298, 304 (Wash. 1989); see also Delmendo, supra note 13, at 833
(citing In re Freightiiner Corp., 95 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 302, 307 (1990) (Tilbury, Arb.)).
118. Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280, 282 (N.M. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109
(1989).
119. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Beaty, 402 F. Supp. 652, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating
that "discharge for cause is generally defined as a discharge for some reason which is not
arbitrary and capricious") (citing International Auto Sales & Serv., Inc. v. General Truck Drivers
Union, Local 270, 311 F. Supp. 313, 315 (E.D. La. 1970)), afld, 542 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1976).
120. See Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 762 F. Supp. 1187,
1189 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (characterizing offensive remarks as unacceptable employee conduct
constituting grounds for discharge), afd, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992).
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sexual assault was insufficient grounds for termination."' These
extreme examples illustrate the root of the employer's quandary;
employers cannot rely on priorjudgments for guidance.
The nature of wrongful termination actions further complicates the
employer's position. Because the questions of fact involved in sexual
harassment cases often are difficult to prove and depend on the
parties' credibility,1 22 it is easy to establish a prima facie challenge
to ajob dismissal for alleged sexual harassment. To state a claim for
wrongful termination, the employee need only deny that he commit123
ted the act of sexual harassment of which he was accused.
II.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS SURROUNDING UNION EMPLOYEES AND LABOR

ARBITRATION

In addition to containing just cause provisions, union collective
bargaining agreements usually require that disputes be resolved
through grievance procedures and, if these fail, through arbitration.12
Thus, arbitrators generally decide wrongful termination
cases involving union employees, while judges and juries decide
similar cases involving nonunion employees. The difference in forum
may produce inconsistent outcomes in similar cases.
In most cases, labor arbitrators review charges of sexual harassment
only after the alleged harasser contests his discharge or other form of
discipline." In these situations, the arbitrator must first determine

121. See Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, 959 F.2d 685, 686-87 & n.1 (7th Cir.)
(discussing arbitrator's decision that discipline milder than discharge was suitable for worker
who grabbed co-worker's breasts), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992).
122. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (stating that whether
complained-of conduct was sexual harassment "presents difficult problems of proof and turns
largely on credibility determinations committed to the trier of fact").
123. See Delmendo, supra note 13, at 843 (arguing that mere denial of conduct for which
employee was discharged is sufficient to pursue claim of wrongful termination). The discharged
employee, however, may confront some practical obstacles to pursuing a wrongful termination
suit. See Tobias, supranote 12, at 190 (stating that for most nonunion employees, bringing suit
is "too cumbersome, expensive, and time consuming"). For instance, if the employee is not a
member of a union, he will need to find an attorney to represent him in his claim. Id. In
addition, obtaining representation may prove difficult if the employee does not have the
financial resources to pay attorney's fees. See id. (arguing that litigation is too expensive for
nonunion workers and that lawyers will not take wrongful discharge cases on contingency fee
basis because amount of recovery does not merit work required).
124. See FLORIAN BARTOSIC & ROGER C. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE
SECTOR 350 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that almost all collective bargaining agreements provide for
grievance procedures and arbitration for resolution of disputes arising under labor agreements);
JOHN J. KENNY, PRIMER OF LABOR RELATIONS 87 (23d ed. 1986) (stating that disputes arising
under union contracts usually are resolved through grievance procedures and arbitration);
OIJrEN & KINImOsEIN, supranote 104, at 153 (noting that most collective bargaining agreements
contain arbitration provisions).
125.

See EDITORIAL STAFF, BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, GRIEVANCE GUIDE 110 (7th ed. 1987)

[hereinafter GRIEVANCE GUIDE]

(indicating that in arbitration, grievances of employees
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whether the discharged employee did in fact commit sexual harassment." 6 Because higher proof requirements,'2 7 relaxed rules of
evidence,1 28 and freedom from stare decisis' distinguish arbitration from trial, the employers' findings of sexual harassment often do
not withstand the arbitrators' review.130
A. Rules of Evidence
Unlike courts, arbitrators are not bound by state and federal rules
of evidence 3 ' and have substantial discretion in setting the burden
3 2 and in swearing
of proof"
in witnesses. 3 3 Arbitrators can, and
often do, exercise discretion in determining the necessary amount of
proof.' Arbitrators decide the quantum of proof on a case-by-case
basis; this practice helps explain the inconsistencies between judicial

discharged for committing sexual harassment are more common than grievances of employees
suffering sexual harassment); ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 237-38 (stating that
arbitrations involving sexual harassment usually are grievances challenging discharge of harassing
co-worker); Monat & Gomez, supranote 52, at 715 (maintaining that most arbitrations involving
sexual harassment are not sex discrimination grievances but rather are just cause grievances in
which alleged harasser contests his discharge); Nelson, supra note 16, at 61 (stating that
overwhelming majority of arbitration cases involving sexual harassment are complaints by
disciplined alleged male harasser).
126. See GRIEvANcE GUIDE, supra note 125, at 110 (stating that consideration ofjust cause for
discipline begins with determination of whether employee's conduct was sexual harassment).
127. See infra notes 131-48 and accompanying text (discussing variable and often elevated
standards of proof in sexual harassment discharge arbitrations).
128. See KENNY, supra note 124, at 91 (stating that arbitrators may decide whether or not to
follow federal rules of evidence).
129. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supranote 1, at 120 (stating that principle of stare decisis does
not fully apply to arbitration). Arbitrators warn against reliance on prior arbitral decisions
because the overwhelming majority of published arbitral decisions are written by inexperienced
arbitrators while the vast body of decisions by experienced arbitrators goes unpublished. Id.; see
also WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 138 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that
stare decisis does not apply to arbitration); infranotes 150-63 (discussing absence of stare decisis
in arbitration and resultant problems for employers defending discharge of employee for sexual
harassment).
130. SeeJennings & Clapp, supra note 15, at 757 (reviewing published arbitration decisions
involving grievances of discharges for sexual harassment and finding that arbitrators reduced
or revoked employer's discipline of grievant in majority of cases). But see GRIEVANCE GUIDE,
supranote 125, at 111 (stating that many arbitrators, relying on EEOC guidelines, have upheld
employers' punishment of harassers).
131. See KENNY, supranote 124, at 91 (stating that arbitrators have great discretion regarding
rules of evidence); see also GOULD, supra note 129, at 138-39 (noting that arbitrators do not
follow judicial rules of evidence).
132. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 174-75 (discussing fact that arbitrators impose
different quantum of proof for different types of cases).
133. See infra note 148 and accompanying text (explaining that arbitration witnesses need
not testify under oath).
134. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 174-75 (reviewing variable quantum of proof
required by arbitrators); see also infra note 139 (discussing arbitrators' choice of higher
evidentiary standard in sexual harassment cases).
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and arbitral decisions"3 5 and among individual arbitral decisions.136
In wrongful termination cases, the burden of proof is on the
employer to show that the alleged sexual harassment occurred and
that such harassment was just cause for termination.13 The degree
of proof needed to sustain this burden, however, is unclear. 138
Some arbitrators simply require that employers prove their cases by
a preponderance of the evidence,13 9 the same standard used by
courts in most civil suits"4 and in all title VII litigation,' and by
Other arbitrators, out of
arbitrators in other disciplinary cases.
apparent concern for the serious effects that termination for sexual
harassment has on the discharged employee,4 adopt a higher
standard of proof and require employers to prove their cases by clear
and convincing evidence'" or beyond a reasonable doubt. 45

135. See ELKouRi & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 174-75 (noting that arbitrators will select
quantum of proof necessary to prove various offenses based on their perceptions of criminality
and seriousness and degree of sanction imposed).
136. See Monat & Gomez, supranote 52, at 715 (explaining that while some arbitrators find
sexual harassment to be grounds for discharge, others hold that such result is too severe).
137. See Monat & Gomez, supranote 52, at 715 (stating that employer has burden of proof
in discharge arbitrations, but noting that in reality, burden shifts to victim of harassment in
discharge cases).
138. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supranote 1, at 239 (finding that employer's burden of proof
in arbitration of sexual harassment termination cases is unresolved).
139. See, e.g., Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. Texas-Guf Fed'n, 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 957, 959
(1991) (Baroni, Arb.) (applying both preponderance of evidence standard and clear and
convincing evidence standard); Western Lake Superior Sanitary Dist. v. Minnesota Arrowhead
Dist., Local 96,94 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 289,294 (1990) (Boyer, Arb.) (applying preponderance
of evidence standard); Clover Park Sch. Dist. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local
286, 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 76, 79 (1987) (Boedecker, Arb.) (applying preponderance of
evidence standard).
140. See EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339, at 956 (3d ed. 1984)
(stating that preponderance of evidence standard is generally used in civil litigation).
141. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252-55, 258 (1989) (holding that title
VII claims require proof by preponderance of evidence and rejecting lower court finding that
such claims must be proved or defended with clear and convincing evidence).
142. See ELKOU= & ELKouRi, supra note 1, at 239 (stating that some arbitrators do not
distinguish sexual harassment from other types of misconduct and apply preponderance of
evidence standard to cases involving all types of misconduct).
143. See Clover Park Sch. Dist. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 286, 89 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 76, 79 (1987) (Boedecker, Arb.) (arguing that in hearing to determine validity of
sexual harassment charges, "[t] he grievant is on trial not only for his job, but his reputation and
his community standing as well'); Hyatt Hotels Palo Alto v. Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees
& Bartenders Union, Local 19, 85 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 11, 14-15 (1985) (Oestreich, Arb.)
("Considering the seriousness of the moral charges and their impact on the Grievant's ability
to find comparable employment elsewhere, the Arbitrator holds that the degree of proof must
be 'beyond reasonable doubt.'").
144. See, e.g., Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. Texas-Gulf Fed'n, 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 957, 959
(1991) (Baroni, Arb.) (stating that arbitrator usually raises standard of proof in sexual
harassment discharge cases to clear and convincing evidence standard); Colonial Sch. Dist. v.
Colonial Transp. Ass'n, 96 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1122,1124 (1991) (DiLauro, Arb.) (concluding
that burden of proof for sexual harassment discipline case is clear and convincing evidence);
Sugardale Foods Inc. v. Local 17A, United Food & Com. Workers, 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
1017, 1020 (1986) (Duda, Arb.) (stating burden of proof for discharge for sexual harassment
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Given the problems of proof intrinsic to many sexual harassment complaints,"4 employers that might prevail in court might fail to meet
the arbitrators' higher standards. 4 7
Incongruous results may also arise from arbitrators' discretion
regarding the swearing in of witnesses. Except where required by
state statute, witnesses in arbitration need not testify under oath."
The absence of an oath requirement is critically important in sexual
harassment cases, where the only evidence often is the testimony of
the alleged victim and the harasser.14 1 Where the parties are not
under oath, the usual deterrence against false testimony does not exist
as it does at trial. Thus, employees discharged for unwitnessed acts
of harassment lack the fear of perjury to prevent them from falsely
denying the charges. Moreover, the absence of an oath requirement
may invite grievants to solicit false witnesses to corroborate their
denials.
B. Stare Decisis and ArbitralPrecedent
Another factor distinguishing labor arbitration from judicial review
of wrongful termination claims is the principle of stare decisis. Unlike
judges, arbitrators are not required to follow precedent. 50 In

as "clear and convincing" evidence).
145. See King Soopers, Inc. v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local 17, 86 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 254, 258 (1985) (Sass, Arb.) (establishing quantum of proof as beyond reasonable
doubt in recognition of potential damage to grievant's marriage, relationship with his children,
community standing, relationships with other employees, and social stigma attached to sexual
harassment).
146. See Alex Kozinski, Forewordto LNDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 26, at v, vii (arguing that
"[c]harges of sexual harassment, like those of rape, child molestation and spousal abuse, can
raise some of the most difficult problems of proof in the law, because some of the most
egregious conduct ... occurs in private, with the participants doubling as the only witnesses");
Monat & Gomez, supra note 52, at 714 (stating that because sexual harassment often occurs
when there are no witnesses, proving that it occurred often is problematic).
147. See supranotes 144-45 and accompanying text (discussing arbitrators' use of clear and
convincing and beyond reasonable doubt evidentiary standards in sexual harassment cases based
in part on stigma that attaches to such accusations); see also supranote 141 and accompanying
text (noting that title VII claims must only be proved by preponderance of evidence standard).
148. See KENNY, supra note 124, at 91 (noting that neither arbitrator nor witness is required
to take oath unless required by state statute). In practice only a small number of states actually
require arbitrators and witnesses to be sworn in. OWEN FAIRWEATHER, PRACtICE AND PROCEDURE
IN LABOR ARBiTRATION 151 & n.1 (1973). But cf. KENNY, supra note 124, at 91 (stating that "[a]
majority of states have some type of provision for the swearing of witnesses, but not all make it
compulsory upon the parties").
149. See Kozinski, supra note 146, It vii (stating that nature of sexual harassment results in
alleged victim and harasser being only witnesses who can testify).
150. See, e.g., BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, supra note 124, at 351 (stating that arbitral decisions in
prior disputes between parties and arbitral decisions involving similar issues but different parties
are not binding precedent unless bargaining agreement states otherwise); ELKOURI & ELKOUR1,
supra note 1, at 120 (noting that arbitration is not bound by stare decisis); GOULD, supra note
129, at 138 (explaining that stare decisis does not apply to labor arbitration).
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addition, because few arbitration decisions are published, there is
Those opinions
scant precedent to which arbitrators can refer.'
that are published are predominantly the decisions of less experienced arbitrators; 5 ' arbitrators are therefore warned not to rely on
these opinions. 5 3
Furthermore, even the small percentage of
published opinions decided by experienced arbitrators are of
questionable use as precedent in sexual harassment cases because
many arbitrators are unfamiliar with the requirements of title VII.M
An arbitrator's freedom from stare decisis and the unavailability of
reliable published opinions prevents employers from using prior cases
as guides when disciplining union employees. 55 Without a means

151. See ELKouRi & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 117 (stating that less than five percent of all
arbitral awards are published and that Bureau of National Affairs publishes only one of every
12 arbitration decisions submitted for publication). The former policy of the National Academy
of Arbitrators (NAA), an association that admits arbitrators based on the number of cases they
have decided, was to prohibit arbitrators from requesting the permission of parties to publish
the opinion until after issuing the opinion. Id. This policy may have reduced the number of
cases that NAA members published. Id.
152. See ELKOURI & ELKouRI, supra note 1, at 117 (stating that NAA policy requiring
arbitrator to issue opinion before requesting parties' permission to publish it resulted in small
percentage of published opinions by experienced arbitrators).
153. SeePeter Seitz, The CitationofAutho7ity and Precedentin Arbitration(Its Use and Abuse), ARB.
J., Dec. 1983, at 58, 60 (warning against relying on prior decisions because overwhelming
majority of published arbitral decisions are written by inexperienced arbitrators).
154. See GouLD, supra note 129, at 143 (stating that arbitrators often do not know
requirements of employment discrimination law). Gould also presents a number of reasons why
"the arbitration process has had considerable difficulty in coping with employment discrimination." Id. at 142. Among these reasons is an inherent conflict of interest experienced by
arbitrators in discrimination cases. Id. at 143. Employers and unions have control over selecting
arbitrators, either during the formulation of the collective bargaining agreement or after the
case to be arbitrated has arisen. Id. at 143-44. According to Gould, arbitrators with reputations
for favoring nondiscriminatory employment practices often are not chosen. Id. In addition,
because the party accused of discrimination has the power to help or hinder the arbitrator's
career (by selecting the arbitrator in the future, recommending the arbitrator to others, or
criticizing the arbitrator), the arbitrator in a discrimination case has an inherent conflict of
interest. Id. at 143. Arbitrators "must necessarily be responsive to the interests of those who
appoint them-labor and management-and not necessarily to those of third parties .
Arbitrators, like other people, are not often likely to bite the hand that feeds them." Id.
The problems surrounding arbitrators' application of antidiscrimination law is just one
example of the much larger issue of arbitral review of cases involving legal issues as opposed to
contract interpretation. See ARNOLD M. ZACK & RICHARD I. BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN
NEGOTIATION AND ARBITRATION 30-31 (1985) (discussing argument that legal issues outside labor
agreement are beyond arbitrators' expertise and that arbitrators are not, and are unlikely to
become, capable of deciding such issues). The ability of arbitrators to decide issues involving
"external law" (i.e., legal issues outside the scope of the bargaining agreement), and the
propriety of arbitrators attempting to decide such issues, are the subjects of wide debate among
labor law experts. See BARTOSIC & HARTLEv, supranote 124, at 353 ("[0] ne of the most pressing
unresolved issues is the extent to which an arbitrator in deciding a case may or should apply
'external' law, such as ... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.... ."); ZACK & BLOCH, supra, at 2932 (discussing debate over external law and views of commentators who believe that extending
arbitral jurisdiction beyond union agreement will undermine parties' regard for individual
arbitrators and arbitration process as whole).
155. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (discussing arbitrators' ability to depart
from prior decisions and lack of reliable precedent).
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to predict whether a discharge could withstand a wrongful termination claim, the employer may be wary of discharging even egregious
offenders and instead may take some milder disciplinary action.
Consequently, where the milder disciplinary action fails to stop the
sexual harassment, a court may hold the employer liable to the victim
of the harassment.

156

The differences between arbitration and trial are likely to have the
greatest effects on employers that employ both union and nonunion
employees.' 57 Employers who are cognizant of the difficulties they

may face in arbitration, as opposed to at trial, may discipline union
harassers less severely than nonunion harassers.15 This result would
both convey mixed messages to employees regarding the employer's
treatment of harassment and fail to deter potential harassers.' 5 9
Furthermore, inconsistent treatment of employees would create a

double standard in violation of the principle of good faith and fair
61
dealing," 6 which is an implied provision of most contracts.1
Finally, disparate punishments may lead to disruptive tensions
between union and nonunion employees, 162 and may prompt union
employees to believe that they can sexually harass female co-workers

with relative impunity.'63

156. See supra notes 84-94 (discussing judicial standards for employer liability for sexual
harassment).
157. Cf S. Richard Pincus & Steven L. Gillmann, The Common Law Contract and Tort Rights
of UnionEmployees: What Effect After the Demise of the -At Will"Doctrine?,59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1007,
1014-15 (1983) (discussing disparate outcomes of similar cases brought in court by nonunion
employees and in arbitration by union members).
158. This conclusion is extrapolated from the disparate processes of review available to union
and nonunion employees. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 26, at 403-10 (discussing
differences and relationship between union collective bargaining, which mandates arbitration
process, and judicial review, which is recourse for nonunion employees); see also infra note 159
(discussing impact on other employees of lenient punishments imposed on harassers).
159. Cf Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that discipline of
harasser must correct harassment and deter potential harassers); Stroehmann Bakeries v. Local
776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 762 F. Supp. 1187, 1189-90 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (discussing impact that
lenient treatment of harasser has on other employees, such as sending message that sexual
harassment claims are not taken seriously, failing to deter future harassers, and inhibiting victims
from complaining), affd, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992).
160. SeeTobias, supra note 12, at 187 (explaining that major aspect of duty of good faith and
fair dealing is requirement that like cases be treated alike).
161. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that most
employment contracts contain implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
162. See MAURICE S. TROTrA, HANDLING GRIEVANCES: A GUIDE FOR MANAGEMENT AND LABOR
58-59 (1976) (stating that employees resent receiving more severe discipline than co-workers who
commit same offense and warning that supervisors who discipline employees inconsistently can
create trouble).
163. See supra note 159 (citing cases discussing importance of employees' perceptions
regarding employers' treatment of harassers as deterrent to potential harassers).
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EXISTING APPROACHES TO LIMITING EMPLOYER LIABILITY ARE
INADEQUATE

A.

Punishment Proportionalto Severity of Harassment

Several courts that have reviewed wrongful termination claims by
employees discharged for sexual harassment have held that employers
should design discipline to be proportional to the severity of the
offense."6 This approach is sound in theory, and can fashion just
results," but sometimes fails in application. ChryslerMotors Corp. v.
InternationalUnion, Allied IndustrialWorkers" illustrates the problems
in applying the proportionality test. 67 In Chrysler,the court upheld
an arbitral decision to reinstate a discharged employee who approached a female co-worker from behind and grabbed her
breasts."
The arbitrator held that the offense was not serious
enough to merit dismissal,'69 explaining that only "extremely serious
offenses, such as stealing or striking a foreman" justify summary
70
discharge1

164. See, e.g., Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that
appropriateness of remedy depends on seriousness of offense, among other considerations);
Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d 685, 688 (7th
Cir.) (upholding arbitrator's decision requiring discipline to be related to seriousness of
employee's proven offense), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,
882 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that not all acts of sexual harassment warrant discharge and that
employer should impose discipline proportional to severity of harassment); Waltman v.
International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 479 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that appropriateness of
remedy depends in part on severity of harassment); Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828
F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that employer took prompt remedial action in response
to sexual harassment and that employer's action was "assessed proportionately to the seriousness
of the offense").
165. See, e.g., Waltman, 875 F.2d at 479-81 n.4 (reversing summary judgment for employer
because factual question existed regarding sufficiency of employer's actions in light of severity
of harassment); Dornheker, 828 F.2d at 309 (holding that employer's response was appropriate
because it was in proportion to seriousness of harassment).
166. 959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992).
167. The court in Chysler quoted an arbitration decision in which the arbitrator stated that:
Under the principle of just cause, extremely serious offenses, such as stealing or
striking a foreman, usually justify summary discharge without the necessity of prior
warnings or attempts at corrective discipline. Less serious infractions call not for
discharge for the first offense, but for some milder penalty aimed at correction.
Chrysler, 959 F.2d at 688.
168. Id. at 686 n.1.
169. &eid. at 686 (stating arbitrator's finding that dismissal of employee who grabbed breasts
of co-worker was not "justcause" for discharge). The arbitrator also faulted the employer for
not considering mitigating circumstances, such as the harasser's work record, as indicators of
his capacity for rehabilitation. Id.; see infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text (discussing
problem of considering good work record as mitigating severity of punishment).
170. Chryser, 959 F.2d at 688; see also ELKOuI&ELKOuRi, supranote 1, at 176-77 (identifying
extremely serious offenses meriting discharge as including stealing and striking foreman, and
distinguishing such offenses from less serious ones such as lateness and absence without
permission).

220

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSriy LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:191

The Chrysler case demonstrates the gravest problem with the
proportionality standard: it allows the reviewing body to substitute its
own judgment of the seriousness of the harassment for the actual
severity experienced by the victim.' 1 ' Such a result conflicts with
the subjective inquiry used to determine whether sexual harassment
in fact occurred. 17 The threshold question for determining whether a particular act is sexual harassment-whether the act was unwel73
come-is determined from the perspective of the affected woman.
When determining whether sexual harassment is severe or pervasive
enough to be actionable, the courts again consider the subjective
experience of the victim as well as how a reasonable person would
feel in the same circumstances. 7 4 As one court has stated, to do
otherwise would "systematically ignore the experiences of women. 1 75 In view of the importance of the victim's subjective experience, allowing the judge or arbitrator to inject his own determination
of severity into the disciplinary equation undermines the purpose and
176
spirit of title VII.

In addition, where judges and arbitrators determine the severity of
the harassment, instead of adopting the victim's perspective, their
personal opinions shape the outcome of cases, thus resulting in
inconsistent verdicts. 77 In Chrysler, the arbitrator simply did not
consider the employee's assault of a co-worker to be a serious

171. In Chysler, the alleged harasser approached a female co-worker from behind and
grabbed her breasts. Chrysler,959 F.2d at 686 n.1. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
referred to the act as a sexual assault. Id. at 687. The arbitrator, however, did not share the
court's appreciation of the seriousness of the offense. Instead, the arbitrator associated the act
with petty offenses such as lateness and absence. Id. at 688.
172. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing unwelcomeness threshold
requirement and subjective standard for determining whether conduct is sexual harassment).
173. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (explaining that unwelcomeness of
harasser's actions is determined by subjective standard based on victim's perceptions). Some
courts have modified the subjective standard to protect employers from liability to hypersensitive
female employees who may perceive harassment where others would not. See Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 873,879 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that standard for sexual harassment allegations is one
that "reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive" to create hostile working
environment).
174. See supranotes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing trend among courts of appeal
to apply two-prong test for severity or pervasiveness, one prong of which is actual subjective
experience of victim).
175. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
176. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881 (stating that Congress enacted title VII to eliminate sexual
stereotypes and "sense of degradation which serve to close or discourage employment
opportunities for women") (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir.
1990)).
177. See infranote 178 and accompanying text (discussing unpredictable role that arbitrator's
personal opinion plays in deciding cases).
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offense.' 78 Another arbitrator may have found the offense to be
179
extremely serious, akin to theft or striking a foreman.
Using a purely subjective standard to determine severity, however,
is also unacceptable. 1"
Such an approach would require the
employer to accommodate abnormally sensitive employees who
perceive harassment when others would not."' Moreover, a purely
subjective standard would both deprive employers of a clear standard
for future sexual harassment cases and result in different punishments
for similar acts, depending on the victim's reaction.
B.

PunishmentBased on Work Record of the Harasser

Arbitrators frequently refer to the harasser's work record as a
mitigating factor when evaluating the appropriateness of disciplinary
action."' The idea that a good work record should be rewarded by
a reduced penalty rests on the faulty theory that a1 8good
work record
indicates that the harasser can be rehabilitated. 3 An employee

178. See Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d 685,
686-88 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that arbitrator equated sexual assault of female employee with
lesser offenses not warranting termination). In reviewing the arbitral decision, the district court
upheld the arbitrator's reliance on his personal opinion, stating that "[i]n the absence of any
explicit provision, the arbitrator is free to bring 'his informed judgment to bear. ..

.'"

Id. at

688 (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 41 (1987)). This is
another example of how arbitration's freedom from stare decisis compounds the employer's
dilemma. If the arbitrator had relied less on his ownjudgment and more onjudicial or arbitral
precedent, the outcome would have been more predictable and less affected by the arbitrator's
opinions.
For another example ofarbitrators allowing their personal opinions to influence the outcome
of cases, see Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 762 F. Supp. 1187,
1189 (M.D. Pa. 1991), affld, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992), where
an arbitrator based his determination to order the reinstatement of a discharged employee
partly on his opinion that the alleged sexual harassment victim was overweight and unattractive.
179. See Judy Mann, Indefensible Distinctions, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1992, at E3 (discussing
Chryslerand criticizing similar outcomes as sexist double standard produced by predominantly
white male judiciary).
180. Cf. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting reasonable woman
standard, rather than purely subjective standard, "[i]n order to shield employers from having
to accommodate the idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee").
181. Id.
182. See Chrysler, 959 F.2d at 688 (stating that arbitrator decided appropriateness of
punishment based on severity of offense and offender's employment record); Howard v.
Department of Air Force, 877 F.2d 952, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that administrative law
judge deciding employee's challenge to discharge for harassment weighed severity of offense
against offender's employment record to determine whether discharge was appropriate penalty);
see also ELKOUi & ELKouiu, supranote 1, at 178 (noting that "[a] recent study which examined
the trends in arbitration awards involving discharge cases found that the prior work record of
the grievant was the most commonly cited factor given consideration by arbitrators") (citing Ken
Jennings et al., The Arbitration ofDischarge Cases: A Fourth Year Perspective, 38 LAB. LJ. 33, 41

(1987)).
183. SeeJennings & Clapp, supranote 15, at 762 (arguing that arbitrators generally uphold
discharge actions where employees had poor performance records, but in other cases reinstate
employees where good long-term performance records indicate that rehabilitation will succeed);
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that has an excellent official work record may also have a long,
undocumented history of harassment"T Furthermore, in traditionally male occupations, the harasser may not have worked with women
for much of his career."s In both of these situations, the harasser's
work record would not reflect his attitude toward women or his
potential for rehabilitation.
The ill-founded concept of considering the harasser's work record
when determining punishment may also have serious and disruptive
consequences in the workplace. First, considering the offender's work
record creates a double standard in which senior employees get
lighter punishments than those with insufficient tenure to establish a
strong work record.18 6 Such a double standard creates a counterproductive message that management will tolerate sexual harassment
by senior employees and will not treat sexual harassment seriously in
general."8 7 As a consequence, harassment by senior employees may
increase, because senior employees will believe that they can harass
with impunity. 88 Furthermore, complaints against senior employees
may decrease as harassed employees become aware of the
management's policy and feel inhibited from bringing complaints
against senior employees. Thus, treating the harasser's work record
as a mitigating factor would perpetuate the problem of sexual
harassment in the workplace,
and therefore would contravene federal
89
antidiscrimination law.'

see also Hyatt Hotels Palo Alto v. Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, Local
19, 85 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 11, 16-17 (1985) (Oestreich, Arb.) (arguing that employee
discharged for sexual harassment seemed to arbitrator, based in part on good work record, to
be capable of rehabilitation).
184. See Chrysler,959 F.2d at 686 (stating that after discharging employee for harassment,
employer discovered that employee had committed four other acts of harassment). This is a
very plausible scenario given the extremely low percentage of sexual harassment victims that
report their harassment. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing low number of
victims that report sexual harassment).
185. See, e.g., Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1491-93, (M.D. Fla.
1991) (involving female welder as plaintiffwho was one of very few female skilled craftsworkers
in business described as "a man's world"); Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369, 370-71
(W.D.N.C. 1988) (involving female truck driver as plaintiff); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589
F. Supp. 780, 782 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (involving plaintiff who was one of only two female
warehouse workers).
186. See supranote 182 (discussing decisions where arbitrators considered harasser's work
record in determining accused harasser's punishment). If the employee is new to the
workplace, the arbitrator has no work record to consider as a mitigating factor.
187. Cf. Kleiman, supra note 8, at C2 (reporting that company that discharged two high-level
employees for sexual harassment conveyed message to all employees that sexual harassment
would not be tolerated).
188. See supra note 182 (explaining that employees with longer work records face greater
prospects of receiving reduced sanctions).
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1988) (prohibiting employer discrimination based on
"race, color, religion, sex or national origin").
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C. Weigh PotentialLiabilities
At least one expert suggests that employers weigh their potential
liabilities and act to minimize their exposure to liability. 19° The
expert who suggests this approach to the employer's dilemma assumes
that dismissing the alleged harasser would expose the employer to the
least liability because offenders often harass more than one vic9 2 individual
tim."' While single harassers have multiple victims,"
9
3
victims often have multiple harassers.'
To encourage employers
to discharge the outnumbered party would result in the continued
exclusion of women from traditionally male-dominated occupa19 4
tions.
The liability minimization theory also fails because it assumes that
liability can be predetermined and is proportional to the number of
persons affected. Until recently, victims of hostile environment sexual
harassment who did not experience any tangible economic loss could
not recover damages for their suffering. 95 Under the old law
governing recovery, a single harasser who created a hostile environment for multiple victims could recover more for wrongful discharge
than all of his victims combined could recover for sexual harass-

190. See Kang, supranote 2, at BI (statement of Richard T. Seymour, director, Employment
Discrimination Project, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law) (recommending that
employers discharge alleged harasser and risk wrongful termination suit because harassers often
have multiple victims who may inflict greater liability upon employer).
191. Kang, supranote 2, at B1.
192. See Howard v. Department of Air Force, 877 F.2d 952, 954 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (upholding
discharge of employee found to be harassing three female co-workers).
193. See, e.g., Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1491-93 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (involving plaintiff who was continuously harassed by numerous male co-workers for 11
years); Tunis v. Coming Glass Works, 747 F. Supp. 951, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (involving plaintiff
subjected to numerous anonymously posted pictures of nude women, whistles, and catcalls from
multiple male co-workers), affd, 930 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1991); Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693
F. Supp. 369,371-74 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (involving female truck driver harassed by numerous male
co-workers and customers); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 782-83 (E.D. Wis.
1984) (involving plaintiff who was repeatedly harassed by four male co-workers).
194. See supra note 185 (discussing cases where female employees experienced harassment
while working in traditionally male-dominated fields). Female harassment victims working in
traditionally male-dominated professions often have multiple harassers. According to the liability
minimization theory, the most cost-effective solution for the employer would be to eliminate the
small number of women rather than the multiple male harassers. Such a result is socially
undesirable as it would continue the exclusion of women from traditionally male jobs.
195. See Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1237 (7th Cir. 1989)
(stating that because title VII provides for only equitable relief, "including back pay and
reinstatement but not compensatory damages," court may not assess damages for noneconomic
injuries), cert. denid 493 U.S. 1036 (1990); Bradford, supra note 10, at 1613 (writing in 1990 that
'under current judicial interpretations of tide VII, a victim of hostile work environment
discrimination may establish employer liability, and yet obtain no relief at all since the
psychological and other intangible injuries that form the basis for the employer's liability receive
no compensation").
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ment.196 Weighing the liabilities, therefore, would prompt an
employer to allow the harassment to continue.
Now that victims of sexual harassment can recover compensatory
and punitive damages, firing the outnumbered party may make more
sense.1 97 It remains a dangerous suggestion, however, because it
encourages the dismissal of alleged harassers without thorough
investigation. Weighing the liabilities thus creates opportunities for
Furthermore, recovery for
false accusations of harassment. 98
wrongful termination ranges from reinstatement9' to recovery of
future earnings."t° Due to the range of remedies, it is difficult for
an employer to accurately predetermine the extent of potential
liability for wrongful termination.
D. Remove Just Cause Provisions
Several commentators have suggested that employers remove just
cause provisions from employment contracts as a way of avoiding
liability for wrongful termination.2"' Simply omitting just cause as
a written term of a contract will not necessarily protect the employer,
however, because courts have demonstrated a willingness to find
implied contractual provisions requiring just cause for dismissal."'
Recognizing this phenomenon, one commentator recommends that
employers require employees to sign statements releasing the

196. See supranotes 10, 195 (discussing situations prior to Civil Rights Act of 1991 in which
sexual harassment plaintiffs won their lawsuits but were denied remedies because title VII only
granted equitable relief). Where victims of sexual harassment suffered no tangible economic
detriment, they could not recover any damages from their employers.
197. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
changes in remedies available under title VII).
198. If employers do not carefully investigate claims of harassment, employees may make
false accusations against unpopular co-workers. Because incidents of sexual harassment are
rarely witnessed, the charges are difficult to prove or disprove. See supranotes 146, 149.
199. See PanelDiscussion, supra note 116, at 325 (stating that when judges and arbitrators
reinstate victorious wrongful discharge plaintiffi, employers usually buy out employee to avoid
returning him to workplace).
200. See Diggs v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 861 F.2d 914, 924 (6th Cir. 1988) (awarding
"front pay," which is future earnings until retirement, to wrongfully discharged plaintiff);
Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 622 F. Supp. 232, 236 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that front pay
can be appropriate remedy in wrongful discharge cases where reinstatement is inappropriate).
201. See Brown, supra note 1, at 808 (advising employers to avoid language that suggests
guarantee ofjust cause for termination). But see Delmendo, supra note 13, at 843 (criticizing
theory that employers can avoid wrongful termination lawsuits by removing just cause provision
from employment contracts).
202. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (listing cases that have accepted implied
contract theories in support of wrongful termination claims where employment contract
contained no just cause provision); see also Delmendo, supra note 13, at 843-44 (arguing that
employers cannot avoid termination disputes by omitting just cause provision from employment
contracts because many such disputes involve implied promises to terminate only forjust cause).
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employer from liability for discharging the employee for any
reason. 2 3 Given the legal trend in opposition to employment at
will, however, courts would likely find such waivers unconsciona20 4
ble.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EMPLOYERS
A.

Employers Should Institute Sexual HarassmentPolicies That Clearly
Define and ProscribeSexual Harassment
Commentators and advocates have joined the EEOC in asserting
that prevention is the employer's "best tool" for eradicating sexual
harassment20 5 and thereby avoiding liability. To prevent sexual
harassment among their employees, employers should adopt a strict,
written sexual harassment policy that all employees can understand.
The policy should define and provide examples of sexually harassing
conduct and should state emphatically that sexual harassment is
prohibited and is cause for discipline or discharge.2 0 Once an
employer adopts a sexual harassment policy, the employer should
disseminate copies of the policy throughout the workplace and
instruct employees to read and retain them for future reference.
Additional copies should be posted throughout the workplace.

203. Brown, supranote 1, at 808 ("The employer could ask the applicant to sign a statement
such as the following: '... my employment and compensation can be terminated, with or
without cause, and with or without notice, at any time, at the option of either the Company or
myself.,.).
204. See Note, ProtectingAt W'llEmployees Against WrongfulDischarge: TheDuty to TerminateOnly
in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1828-29 & nn.72-74 (1980) (noting that some commentators recognize disparity of bargaining power and absence of negotiation between workers and
potential employers and analogize at-will employment contract to boilerplate contract containing
unconscionable terms); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (stating that
"[i]f a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may
refuse to enforce the contract"). In determining whether a contract is unconscionable, courts
may look to the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties. See Note, supra, at 1828-29
(discussing argument that courts should consider relative bargaining power of employee and
employer and should find at-will contracts unconscionable when employer's bargaining power
is superior). Unequal bargaining power, however, is not determinative of unconscionability.
RESTATEMENT, supra, at cmt. d. Rather, "gross inequality of bargaining power, together with
terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party... may show that the weaker party had no
meaningful choice" and that the contract was unconscionable. Id.
205. EEOC Guidelines, supranote 46, § 1604.11(f). The EEOC Guidelines state:
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer
should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate
sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of
harassment under title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
Id.
206. See inftanotes 217-20 and accompanying text (recommending that employment contract
stipulate sexual harassment asjust cause for discharge).
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In addition to distributing the written policy, employers should
discuss the sexual harassment policy at employee meetings. Such
meetings would serve both to discourage harassment and to encourage victims of harassment to complain to management.2 0 7 Employers should also institute mandatory sexual harassment workshops and
seminars aimed at specific groups of employees. These meetings
would educate and sensitize employees to the issues surrounding
sexual harassment and should convince employees of the employer's
determination to prevent sexual harassment. Thus, the very act of
holding special meetings to specifically address sexual harassment
should deter potential harassers and encourage victims to lodge
complaints.
The employer's policy should designate management-level
employees who would answer employee questions and receive
complaints of sexual harassment. An employer should designate at
least two such employees: one woman and one man. Reporting
sexual harassment can be embarrassing for the victim. Making
available a person of the same gender may alleviate some of the
embarrassment that prevents some victims from coming forward.
Similarly, victims of sexual harassment may feel that a person of the
same sex may be more sensitive or sympathetic to their situation than
would a person of the opposite sex. Thus, by making available a
person of the victim's gender, the employer might encourage
increased reporting of sexual harassment.
After receiving a sexual harassment complaint, the employer must
act quickly to investigate the complaint. To speed the process, the
employer should already have in place an investigation procedure that
can be implemented immediately upon receipt of a complaint. If the
investigation confirms the complaint, the employer must discipline
the harasser immediately.
Adopting a sexual harassment policy will not automatically shield
the employer from liability to victims of harassment.20 8 Educating
and sensitizing employees, however, may prevent potential harassers
from becoming actual offenders.2" Thus, such a policy would help
207. The EEOC Guidelines state that employers should "affirmatively rais[e] the subject,
expressing strong disapproval... informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise
the issue of harassment under title VII." EEOC Guidelines, supra note 46, § 1604.11(f).
208. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72-73 (1986) (rejecting employer's claim
that "mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with
[victim's] failure to invoke that procedure, must insulate [employer] from liability"); Davis v. TriState Mack Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that mere existence of
sexual harassment policy does not guarantee employer protection from liability to victim).

209. See Ti-State Mack 981 F.2d at 344 (finding that if employer had sexual harassment
policy, "perhaps [harasser] would not have engaged in the offending conduct").
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limit the employer's liability for sexual harassment.

°

B. Arbitration Agreements Should Establish Rules for Discharge
ProceedingsInvolving Sexual Harassment
To alleviate the problems surrounding arbitration of wrongful
211
discharge claims by workers discharged for sexual harassment,
employers of union members whose collective bargaining agreements
contain arbitration clauses should negotiate explicit arbitration rules
for discharge grievances involving sexual harassment. Such agreements should parallel the rules by which similar cases would be
governed at trial. By eliminating much of the arbitrator's discretion,
the employer would increase the predictability of arbitral cases.
Furthermore, the employer would reduce the likelihood that union
and nonunion employees would receive different treatment in similar
cases.

2 12

The arbitration rules should specify that the employer must prove
its case by a preponderance of the evidence, thus eliminating the
arbitrator's power to determine the quantum of proof on a case-bycase basis.21 3 By establishing a uniform burden of persuasion, the
arbitration agreement will create greater consistency among individual
arbitration cases and between cases decided by arbitrators and by
courts. Moreover, the proposed arbitration agreement would balance
the interests of the parties and ensure a fairer outcome than the
current system. The proposed agreement would not switch the
burden of going forward with the evidence, which would remain with
the employer. Thus, the employee will not bear the more difficult
burden of proving that he did not commit the harassment.2 1 4 By
allowing the employer to prove his case by a preponderance of the
evidence and ensuring that the arbitrator will not assign some higher

210. SeeWILiAM F. PEPPER & FLORYNCE R. KENNEDY, SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
-52 (1981) (noting unlikelihood of employer liability where sexual harassment policy is in place,
implementation procedures exist, and procedures are applied quickly and fairly).
211. See supranotes124-63 and accompanying text (discussing special problems surrounding
arbitration of wrongful discharge claims).

212. See supra notes 123, 157-58 (discussing inconsistencies between judicial review of cases
involving nonunion employees and arbitration of cases involving union employees).
213. See supra notes 134-47 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary standard used by
arbitrators).
214. Despite the proofproblems often encountered by employers in sexual harassment cases,
it generally is easier to prove that something occurred than to prove that it did not occur. Cf
PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 193-95 (2d ed. 1990)

(discussing problems surrounding proof of nonoccurrence).
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standard, the proposed rule guarantees the employer a fair opportunity to prove its case. 15
The arbitration agreement also should require that all witnesses in
sexual harassment discharge grievances testify under oath. By
introducing the specter of perjury to the arbitration setting, the
proposed rule would reduce the prospect of false testimony. Such
control over the testimony of witnesses and parties is crucial in cases
involving sexual harassment because these cases are often devoid of
extrinsic evidence and are essentially credibility contests.
Finally, the arbitration agreement should bind the arbitrator to the
legal precedent established by the courts of the jurisdiction in which
the alleged harassment occurred. This provision, like the one
establishing the level of proof, would ensure greater uniformity
among sexual harassment discharge cases decided in arbitration and
in court.
While inserting such provisions into arbitration agreements may
reduce the informality for which arbitration is acclaimed,2 16 the
benefits outweigh this disadvantage. Requiring that arbitration mirror
civil litigation with regard to the swearing in of witnesses, the
quantum of proof, and the doctrine of stare decisis would alleviate
some of the uncertainties that employers now face when disciplining
employees for sexual harassment. Arbitration decisions would
become more consistent, both with each other and with court
decisions. Employers would thus be able to use prior cases to guide
their treatment of sexual harassment. Moreover, the knowledge that
challenges by union and nonunion employees would be decided
similarly would enable employers to discipline all employees equally.
Finally, many of the benefits of arbitration would not be affected. For
example, parties would continue to avoid crowded judicial dockets,
and they would still resolve their conflicts more quickly than if they
went to trial.
C.

Employment Contract Should Stipulate Sexual Harassment asJust
Causefor Dismissal

To protect themselves against wrongful termination claims by
discharged harassers, employers should include in all employment

215. See supranote 146 and accompanying text (stating that because of proof problems often
attendant to sexual harassment cases, employers cannot meet higher burdens of persuasion
imposed by some arbitrators).
216. See BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, supranote 124, at 351 (stating that grievance procedure and
arbitration are valued for being informal, inexpensive, and expeditious means of resolving labor
disputes).
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contracts a provision specifying sexual harassment as just cause for
dismissal. By designating sexual harassment as grounds for dismissal
within the employment contract, the employer avoids the problems
2 17
surrounding the vague common law definitions of "just cause."
In addition, such a contractual provision may deter potential harassers
by conveying the message to employees that the employer considers
sexual harassment a serious offense.
By defining sexual harassment as just cause for dismissal in
employee contracts, an employer will strengthen its case should an
employee discharged for sexual harassment file a wrongful discharge
claim. Such a provision will thus reduce the employer's risk of
liability to the discharged harasser. Furthermore, the presence of
such a provision in the employment contract may dissuade discharged
harassers from pursuing wrongful discharge claims, thereby reducing
both the employer's risk of liability to harassers and its legal expenses
in defending against such claims.
Stipulating sexual harassment as just cause for dismissal, however,
should not increase the likelihood that an employer will discharge
wrongly accused employees and minor offenders. In the absence of
wrongful discharge claims, there remain many economic disincentives
to prevent such unnecessary discharges.21 s Such disincentives
include the cost of training a replacement worker, loss of training
invested in the discharged worker, and damage to company morale.219 Moreover, a reputation for unwarranted discharges will
impede future recruitment efforts.2 Such economic disincentives
to baseless discharges would protect the rights of accused harassers
while the proposed contractual provision would protect the employer
from unfounded wrongful discharge claims.
CONCLUSION

The current trends in sexual harassment and wrongful discharge
law place the employer in a precarious position. If the employer fails
to halt the harassment, it may be liable to the victim. If the employer

217. Cf.Delmendo, supranote 13, at 838 & n.62 (stating that where employer stipulates in
employment contract conduct that will result in termination, stipulated conduct is per sejust
cause as long as employer's rule is reasonably related to maintaining workplace order).
218. Cf. WELnYR, supra note 13, at 59 (arguing that "[e]mployers do not want to fire
employees for no reason," because to do so creates economic loss for employer as well as for
employee).
219. See wLER, supra note 13, at 59 (stating that employer who unnecessarily discharges
employee loses investment in employee and that such loss serves as disincentive to unnecessary
firing).

220. WERu,

supra note 13, at 59.
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ends the harassment by terminating the harasser, it may be liable to
the harasser. The dilemma is especially difficult for employers of
union employees, for whom disputes may be resolved under unpredictable arbitration rules. As awareness of sexual harassment grows,
the employer's dilemma worsens.
Employers can limit their liability to employees by acting carefully
when formulating employment contracts and by implementing
effective sexual harassment policies. A well-designed and implemented sexual harassment policy will prevent some sexual harassment and
will facilitate the discovery and correction of harassment that does
occur. By adopting the proposed arbitration rules, employers can
avoid the problems that accompany sexual harassment discharge
grievances. Finally, by designating sexual harassment asjust cause for
dismissal, the employer will deter acts of sexual harassment and
actions for wrongful discharge. Thus, while the employer's dilemma
is difficult, it is not insurmountable.

